Senate finally confirms President Trump’s nominee for Intelligence Community watchdog

Last week, the Senate finally approved the nomination of former Department of Justice attorney Michael Atkinson to be Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.  We commended President Trump on his decision to name Mr. Atkinson as a watchdog back in November 2017.  According to one source, part of the long delay in the confirmation process was due to Senate negotiations with the Director of National Intelligence over the firing of Dan Meyer, the Intelligence Community’s whistleblower ombudsman.  Yet it is still a sad reflection of the current political climate that Mr. Atkinson’s nomination was pending for roughly six months.

As I have argued previously, one of the most troubling aspects of President Obama’s legacy was his failure to nominate permanent Inspectors General (“IGs”) at many agencies across the federal government.  Without presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed leadership, there is always a real danger that IG offices will lack the necessary commitment to transparency and accountability in government.  Indeed, Senator Ron Johnson has argued that “acting” IGs—who are typically career civil servants—risk being “not truly independent [because] they can be removed by the agency at any time; they are only temporary and do not drive office policy; and they are at greater risk of compromising their work to appease the agency or the president.”

When President Obama left office, twelve agencies lacked an IG.  During his first year in office, President Trump steadily moved to remedy this dearth of leadership, but the pace of new nominations slowed at the end of last year, and much more now needs to be done.  According to the Project on Government Oversight, which has been tracking IG vacancies since the Obama Administration, there are currently nine agencies without a permanent watchdog, six of which must be appointed by the White House.  This includes vacancies at major Cabinet-level agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  The Department of the Interior, sadly, continues to lack a permanent IG since the previous watchdog left office 3,374 days ago.

Of course, not all the blame should be placed on the inaction or slow decision-making of President Trump.  Aside from Mr. Atkinson’s recent confirmation, another four presidential nominations have been pending in the Senate for an average of 236 days.  When the White House has moved to fill these watchdog vacancies, the Senate should prioritize its consideration and the confirmation process.  Many Executive Branch agencies have substantial budgets, and presidentially-appointed IGs provide a vital internal check on waste, fraud, and abuse.

Ryan P. Mulvey is Counsel at Cause of Action Institute.

Oversight Victory: Tax Regulations Now Subject to OMB Review

In a major win for oversight and constitutional governance, the White House Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) and the Department of the Treasury have scrapped a decades-old agreement that exempted many IRS tax regulations from independent review and oversight.  In its place, the agencies have set up a new agreement that requires Treasury to submit important tax regulations to OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for review pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 (“EO 12,866”) just like nearly every other agency.

This change came after an investigative report from Cause of Action Institute and a sustained campaign over the past few months from supporters of OIRA review.  From a transparency perspective, this agreement is already an improvement because it has been announced publicly, posted on Treasury’s website, and not kept secret for thirty-five years, like the previous agreement.

 

The New Memorandum of Agreement

The new agreement will require Treasury to submit the following categories of tax regulations to OIRA for review:

All three categories are well conceived.  First, one of the main focuses of OIRA review has always been interagency consultation.  And IRS rules can overlap with rules from the Department of Labor and, increasingly in the wake of the Affordable Care Act, the Department of Health and Human Services.  Allowing those and other agencies to weigh in on proposed tax regulations is an appropriate and necessary level of oversight, and can lead to better policymaking.  At the Senate hearing where the agreement was unveiled, Senator Lankford asked Treasury General Counsel Brent McIntosh who will make the determination of whether a new rule is likely to create a conflict with another agency.  McIntosh replied that, under the agreement, Treasury will submit a list of rules to OIRA on a quarterly basis and OIRA will then be in a position to flag rules that may create a conflict.

Second, Treasury will send OIRA tax regulations that raise novel legal or policy issues.  These are exactly the type of rules should not be decided in a vacuum and when independent review from OIRA and others can provide a fresh look at novel questions.  This is also an existing category of rules that are covered by EO 12,866 and so it makes sense to include tax regulations in this existing mandate.

Third, and finally, the new agreement includes tax regulations that are likely to have an annual non-revenue impact on the economy of $100 million or more.  This is the existing threshold for significant regulatory actions for other agencies.  The agreement makes a distinction for the “non-revenue” impact of tax regulations.  This is a commonsense distinction because OIRA review and cost-benefit considerations should be focusing on the distortionary impacts of regulatory choices, not money transferred to the fisc.  This modification of the existing language in EO 12,866 was necessary to fit the existing system to the way tax regulations work.  At the hearing, Senator Lankford asked McIntosh which rules from the 2017 tax cuts may meet this threshold.  McIntosh estimated that rules related to pass-through entities, interest expense deductions, bonus depreciation, section 199A, partnerships under section 512, and section 951A could now be subject to OIRA review.

 

The New MOA Puts OIRA in Control

The new agreement includes an important provision that bars Treasury from rushing rules out the door to the Federal Register before OIRA has signed off.

In order for the president and the White House to properly oversee the Executive Branch, they must be able to control its regulatory actions.  This provision makes it explicit that OIRA gets the final say.

 

Agreement Addresses Concerns about Delay and Expertise

Perhaps the biggest pushback against subjecting tax regulations to the same review that applies to other agencies’ rules was concerns about delay.  The new agreement addresses that issue by putting a 45-day clock on OIRA review and a special 10-business-day expedited review for rules stemming from the 2017 tax cuts.  Responding to concerns about OIRA’s expertise, Administrator Naomi Rao announced that Minnesota Law Professor and tax administration expert Kristin Hickman was joining OIRA as an advisor.  And OMB has been staffing up on other tax experts as well.

 

Concerns about the New Agreement

There is at least one concern about the agreement.  It only applies to “tax regulatory actions,” which the agreement gives the same meaning as “regulatory actions” in EO 12,866.  That definition covers “any substantive action by an agency (normally published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking.”  Noticeably absent from this definition are interpretative rules that are not published in the Federal Register.  The IRS is notorious for trying to claim that its rules are interpretative and do not need to follow the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act.  (CoA Institute recently filed an amicus brief in a case challenging this behavior.)  It remains to be seen whether the IRS and Treasury will try to assert that interpretative rules do not meet the definition of a “regulatory action” under EO 12,866 and thus do not need to be sent to OIRA for review.  A fair reading of the term “regulatory action” should include interpretative rules, even under the IRS’s improperly broad definition of that term.

But overall a dramatic improvement in the oversight of tax regulations and milestone in the project to end so-called tax exceptionalism and bring IRS under the same administrative law as everyone else.

James Valvo is Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor at Cause of Action Institute.  He is the principal author of Evading Oversight.  You can follow him on Twitter @JamesValvo.

Congress Investigates IRS for Trying to Evade Oversight

Over the past two weeks, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (“HSGAC”) Chairman Ron Johnson and HSGAC Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs Chairman James Lankford have sent two letters to investigate the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) claim that any economic impact from the agency’s rules is due to the underlying statute and not its regulatory choices.  Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) profiled the IRS claim, its implications, and the role of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in a recent investigative report and op-ed.

HSGAC Letter to OIRA

On February 1, 2018, Chairmen Johnson and Lankford sent a letter to OIRA urging the White House regulatory office to reconsider a “longstanding agreement between [OIRA] and the Department of the Treasury to exempt regulations issued by the [IRS] from the requirements contained in Executive Order 12866.”

In 1983, OIRA, under President Reagan, agreed to create a three-tiered system to review IRS rules, which has resulted in very few IRS rules being sent to the White House regulatory office for pre-publication review.[1]  The IRS finally released the long-secret agreement in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from CoA Institute.  The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has also called for the agreement to be revisited.

In their letter, Chairmen Johnson and Lankford:

strongly urge[d] [OIRA] to revisit the regulatory agreement between OIRA and Treasury, as directed by President Trump’s EO 13789, with a critical eye as to why this agreement is necessary.  [They] also encourage[d] OIRA to implement all the recommendations in GAO’s September 2016 report and provide a full explanation to the Committee and Subcommittee in the event that OIRA declines to implement any of GAO’s recommendations.

The Chairmen also announced that they “intend[] to hold an oversight hearing in the very near future regarding OIRA activities.  The issues outlined in this letter will likely constitute a major part of this hearing.”

This effort is important because OIRA plays a key role in coordinating and legitimizing Executive Branch regulatory actions.  If an agency is able to make federal regulatory policy without oversight from the President, that policy not only lacks independent review but also political legitimacy.  OIRA is well-positioned to rein in the IRS and demand that the agency begin to do the same pre-publication regulatory cost-benefit analysis and economic-impact analysis as other federal agencies.

It will be interesting to hear OIRA Administrator Neomi Rao’s thoughts on the long-standing, long-secret memo at a congressional oversight hearing, as I do not believe OIRA as an institution has spoken on the issue since 1993.  Hopefully, Administrator Rao will take this opportunity to review and end the agreement between OIRA and Treasury and bring the IRS into line with other agencies.

HSGAC Letter to IRS

In addition, on February 13, 2018, Chairmen Johnson and Lankford sent a letter to Acting IRS Commissioner David Kautter presenting many of the findings from CoA Institute’s report.[2]  In their letter, the Chairmen summarized the report’s central finding:

[CoA Institute’s] report found that the IRS “takes the position that its rules have no economic effect because any impact is attributable to the underlying law that authorized the rule, not the agency’s decision to issue or alter the rule.”  The IRS’s position apparently dates back nearly 20 years, when the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued a notice taking this position.  The report notes that while the IRS initially limited its economic analysis exemption to only “interpretative regulations and revenue impacts, both limitations fell away over time.”

The Chairmen asked the IRS a number of oversight questions, to learn more about the agency’s behavior and any justification it may have.  First, they asked whether “the IRS has conducted any retrospective economic impact analyses of regulations that did not receive an initial economic impact analysis.”  I am dubious that the IRS has done so.  If it believes its rules are exempt from initial economic impact analysis, I doubt its going back to see if it was right or wrong.  Any retroactive analysis likely would just shift blame back to the underlying statute again.

Second, the Chairmen noted that in 2016 “the Small Business Administration’s [(“SBA”)] Office of Advocacy wrote to the IRS disputing the agency’s assertion that the IRS’s regulations are not subject to the requirement to conduct economic impact analyses.”  The Chairmen want to know if the IRS ever responded to SBA or if any other agencies have pushed back on the IRS claim.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Chairmen asked the IRS to “explain the process by which a determination is made as to whether the agency will or will not conduct an economic impact analysis on a proposed regulation.”  This final question is critical because, up to now, the IRS has provided very little explanation of how it goes about making the determination in an individualized case that a certain rule’s impact flows from the statute.  CoA Institute’s work in this area shows that the agency developed these self-bestowed exemptions over time, found them a convenient tool to avoid additional pre-publication work, and rarely gives more than a boilerplate claim that the exemption applies to certain cases.

It is heartening to see that Chairmen Johnson and Lankford are beginning the oversight process on this issue.  I look forward to seeing the responses from OIRA and the IRS.

James Valvo is Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor at Cause of Action Institute.  He is the principal author of Evading Oversight.  You can follow him on Twitter @JamesValvo.

[1] In 2016, CoA Institute found that “over the past ten years, the IRS has submitted only eight rules to OIRA for regulatory review and deemed only one of those rules significant.  Those eight rules are less than one percent of the final rules the IRS published in the Federal Register over the same period.”

[2] President Trump recently nominated Chuck Rettig to be the new IRS Commissioner, and CoA Institute has urged the Senate Finance Committee to press Mr. Rettig on whether he will end this IRS practice of evading oversight of its regulatory actions.

Rettig Nomination Gives Congress Chance to Hold IRS Accountable

Last month, Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) released an investigative report detailing a pernicious practice at the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  The agency claims that none of the economic impact caused by its rules is attributable to its regulatory choices. Instead it says the impact flows from the underlying statute.  The IRS uses this claim to evade three important oversight mechanisms.  When we released the report, we called on Congress to press whomever President Trump nominated to be the next IRS commissioner to promise to reform this practice.  Well, Trump just nominated Chuck Rettig to head the agency.  So it’s time for Congress to stand up and hold the IRS accountable for its decades-long practice of playing by its own rules.

CoA Institute just sent a letter to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch and Ranking Member Ron Wyden urging them to press Mr. Rettig on this issue during their face-to-face meetings and at a public hearing.

View the Letter Concerning Mr. Rettig’s Nomination Below

Loader Loading...
EAD Logo Taking too long?

Reload Reload document
| Open Open in new tab

Download [394.17 KB]

James Valvo is Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor at Cause of Action Institute.  He is the principal author of Evading Oversight.  You can follow him on Twitter @JamesValvo.

The GSA Has No Records on its New Policy for Congressional Oversight Requests

Last month, Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) detailed how it intended to investigate rumors of the Trump Administration directing federal agencies to ignore “oversight requests” from Democratic legislators.  Reports of the “new policy” sent the transparency community into a frenzy, particularly as they came on the heels of an opinion letter from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel that corroborated much of the scuttlebutt. As part of its investigation, CoA Institute sent a FOIA request to the General Services Administration (“GSA”) seeking access to various records concerning the agency’s policies or procedures for handling congressional oversight requests, congressional requests for information, and congressional requests from individual Members for the disclosure of agency documents.  We also requested copies of records evidencing any White House directives on pre-production consultation or review of requests from Congress or under the FOIA.

Last week, the GSA provided its final response.  The response leaves much to be desired, as the agency released only two documents.  The first is a February 20, 2015 order regarding congressional and intergovernmental inquiries; the second is a previously-secret April 15, 2009 White House memo that CoA Institute first made publicly known in June 2013.  The GSA did not find (or at least did not produce) anything pertaining to the Trump Administration’s new policy to respond only to Republican congressional leadership.

The General Services Administration’s failure to locate relevant records is curious because its acting administrator, Timothy Horne, previously testified before Congress that “the [Trump] Administration has instituted a new policy that matters of oversight need to be requested by the Committee chair.”  Admittedly, he clarified that the White House itself hadn’t distributed a finalized, written version of its policy, but it stands to reason that the GSA would still have some record of its effort to formalize whatever oral directions were issued by the White House.  Similarly, to the extent the GSA may now be processing any congressional disclosure requests under the FOIA, the agency should have records concerning those policies and procedures.  None were given to CoA Institute.

We have filed an appeal challenging the adequacy of the General Services Administration’s search efforts.  And we are still waiting for the Office of Personnel Management to respond to a similar request.  In the meantime, CoA Institute remains committed to holding the Executive Branch accountable to one of the most important principles of good government: transparency.

Ryan Mulvey is Counsel at Cause of Action Institute.

Senator Grassley Questions FBI Director Comey About Clinton Grand Jury Revelation made in CoA Institute Federal Records Act Litigation

Today, Senator Chuck Grassley questioned FBI Director James Comey about why the FBI revealed the information about the grand jury to us in litigation but refused to release the same information to him in response to congressional oversight.  The video of the hearing is available here; the exchange begins around the 3:09 mark.

As discussed in previous blog posts (here, here, and here), Cause of Action Institute, together with Judical Watch, is litigating a Federal Records Act case to compel the State Department and National Archives and Records Administration to perform their statutory obligations to initiate action through the Attorney General for the complete recovery of email records unlawfully removed from federal custody by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Last week, the government filed a declaration from Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Special Agent E.W. Priestap, which revealed for the first time that the FBI had obtained grand jury subpoenas related to the Clinton email investigation.  Preistap stated: “The FBI also obtained Grand Jury subpoenas related to the Blackberry e-mail accounts, which produced no responsive materials, as the requested data was outside the retention time utilized by those providers.”

Here’s a transcript of key portions of that exchange:

Senator Chuck Grassley: Last week, the FBI filed a declaration in court pursuant to Freedom of Information Act litigation [ed. actually, it is a Federal Records Act case].  The FBI said that a grand jury issued subpoenas for Secretary Clinton’s emails.  Yet you refuse to tell this Committee whether the FBI sought or had been denied access to grand jury process from the Justice Department.  So, I think a very simple question is why does the FBI give more information to someone who files a lawsuit than to an oversight committee of Congress?  That has happened to me several times.

Director Comey: I’m not sure, Senator, whether that’s what happened here.  But you’re right, I refused to confirm in our hearings as to whether we used a grand jury and how.  I think that’s the right position.  Because I don’t know it well enough, I don’t think I can tell you . . . I don’t think I can distinguish the statements made in the FOIA case, as I sit here.

Senator Chuck Grassley: Just as a matter of proposition then!  If, I, Chuck Grassley as a private citizen file a Freedom of Information Act [request] and you give me more information than you’ll give to Senator Chuck Grassley, how do you justify that?

Director Comey:  Yeah, it’s a good question

Senator Chuck Grassley:  What do you mean it’s a good question?!  How do you justify it?!

Director Comey: It’s a good question, I can’t [justify it] as I sit here.

Senator Chuck Grassley:  Ye gods . . .

. . .

When was the grand jury convened? Was it before your first public statement about closing [the Clinton] case?

Director Comey: I’m still not in a position where I’m comfortable confirming whether and how we used a grand jury . . . in an open setting.  I don’t know enough about what was said in the FOIA case to know whether that makes my answers silly.  But I just want to be so careful about talking about grand jury matters.  So, I’m not going to answer that, sir.

In a word, yes, it does make Director Comey look silly to refuse to confirm the FBI’s use of grand jury subpoenas to Senator Grassley when the FBI has already sworn to the existence of the grand jury in federal court.

This exchange highlights one of the challenges of congressional oversight: agencies often refuse to cooperate with Congress.  That’s where CoA Institute steps in and helps bring transparency to an opaque federal government.

James Valvo is Counsel & Senior Policy Advisor at Cause of Action Institute and you can follow him on Twitter @JamesValvo.