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02/13/2018

Regulation Czar Neomi Rao Discusses Deregulatory Agenda

In his State of the Union address last month, President Donald J. Trump patted himself on the back for the economic boom and the steady drop in unemployment over the past year. Many economists agree that he ought to take some credit, and suggest his deregulatory push has played a role. To discuss the Trump administration’s regulatory achievements, Neomi Rao, the president’s appointee for administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) last week joined the Federalist Society’s Free Lunch Podcast.

Last year was “a banner year for regulatory reform,” Rao said in the beginning of the podcast.

When Trump took office, he signed Executive Order 13771, ordering agencies to eliminate two regulations for every new regulation added. It also capped the net cost of new regulations to zero dollars. This means that for every new dollar in regulatory costs, one offsetting dollar had to be cut from regulatory costs elsewhere.

Rao said that the administration lived up to Trump’s campaign promise – and then some. For every new regulation added, 22 regulatory actions were cut, which she said far exceeded his promise. Additionally, the net savings for Americans on regulations was $8 billion, also exceeding his promise. The administration also halted 1500 new rules proposed under the previous administration because, Rao said, it wants to analyze the scope and content of all regulations.

But more important than these small changes, according to Rao, the administration is striving to make structural and cultural reform, which would hopefully extend into future administrations. “We want to continue with the momentum from the past year and with the success that we had,” she said.

For example, Rao indicated that agencies must properly follow the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), which Rao claims requires them to submit proposed regulations to OIRA, so it can determine whether it imposes a cost of $100 million or more. If it does, then OIRA sends the proposed regulation to Congress for approval. Agencies that don’t comply, she said, risk some of their rules losing legitimacy.

As Cause of Action Institute has pointed out over the past year, there are hundreds of rules that are currently vulnerable to be repealed under the CRA that have yet to be received by Congress. For example, last month Cause of Action Institute released an investigative report revealing the IRS has dodged compliance with the CRA and other oversight mechanisms by suggesting that its rules have no economic impact, a suggestion that we have argued is false and intended to shield the agency’s actions from oversight.

Apart from the economic effect of excess regulations, Rao said OIRA is working to make sure the government is more respectful of the separation of powers and more transparent. Because only Congress has the power to make laws, Rao said it can be dangerous to increase the power of the executive branch to the extent that it is making a lot of rule changes. To improve transparency, OIRA will ensure that agencies comply with a federal law that requires they give public notices of new rules and regulations so that the public and stakeholders have an opportunity to voice their support or opposition. Additionally, Rao said OIRA will be working to reduce paperwork for businesses to save them cost and time.

The Trump administration has made progress in the past year to cut regulatory red tape. Hopefully the administration can continue going in this direction with a series of structural changes to scale back the administrative state.

Tyler Arnold is a communications associate at Cause of Action Institute.

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02/9/2018

Rettig Nomination Gives Congress Chance to Hold IRS Accountable

Last month, Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) released an investigative report detailing a pernicious practice at the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  The agency claims that none of the economic impact caused by its rules is attributable to its regulatory choices. Instead it says the impact flows from the underlying statute.  The IRS uses this claim to evade three important oversight mechanisms.  When we released the report, we called on Congress to press whomever President Trump nominated to be the next IRS commissioner to promise to reform this practice.  Well, Trump just nominated Chuck Rettig to head the agency.  So it’s time for Congress to stand up and hold the IRS accountable for its decades-long practice of playing by its own rules.

CoA Institute just sent a letter to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch and Ranking Member Ron Wyden urging them to press Mr. Rettig on this issue during their face-to-face meetings and at a public hearing.

View the Letter Concerning Mr. Rettig’s Nomination Below

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James Valvo is Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor at Cause of Action Institute.  He is the principal author of Evading Oversight.  You can follow him on Twitter @JamesValvo.

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02/7/2018

CFPB’s Constitutionality Problem: Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?

Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?

Could a dispute over the constitutionality of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) overturn a thirty-year-old Supreme Court precedent and vindicate the late Justice Antonin Scalia in one of his most famous dissents?  On the last day of January, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion on the structure of that controversial independent agency:  PHH Corporation, et. al., v. CFPB, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir., January 31, 2018) en banc.   This opinion, with concurrences and dissents, is two hundred fifty pages long.  There is an awful lot to unpack, but this post will only focus on one glaring precedent that jumps out from the Opinion and every concurrence and dissent:  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)

In a quick review, I counted 43 citations of it in the Opinion, 12 in a concurrence and 40 times in the dissents (many of these were to Scalia’s lone dissent).  There is only one Justice now on the Court who was on the Court when Morrison was decided.  But Justice Kennedy took no part in consideration of the case.  Of all the protagonists, only Kennedy and Ted Olson (the Olson in the caption and also counsel for PHH) are still in the picture.

In a nutshell, the majority and the concurrences rely on Morrison v. Olson for the proposition that the “independent” nature of the head of the CFPB is constitutional.  Not unreasonably, Judge Pillard and her majority believe that case is binding and it allows a single administrator insulated from at-will dismissal by the President.  The dissents believe they have distinguished that case and another older precedent, and the combination of insulation from Congress and from the Executive makes the CFPB different and worse from other agencies whose structures have been upheld in the past.  Judge Kavanaugh puts his finger on the shaky foundation upon which the majority builds. In footnote 3 of his dissent he notes:

Recall, moreover, that the independent counsel experiment ended with nearly universal consensus that the experiment had been a mistake and that Justice Scalia had been right back in 1988 to view the independent counsel system as an unwise and unconstitutional departure from historical practice and a serious threat to individual liberty. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“this wolf comes as a wolf”); see also Stanford Lawyer 4 (Spring 2015) (quoting Justice Kagan’s statement that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison is “one of the greatest dissents ever written and every year it gets better”). The independent counsel experience strongly counsels against single-Director independent agencies.

Scalia’s famous “called shot” of the trouble such a statute would cause has echoed down the years and is one reason why the Independent Counsel statute was not renewed.  It is also telling that when Morrison was decided the renaissance of originalism, textualism and the focus on separation of powers were in their infancy.  Now, a generation and a half of scholars and judges have grown up reading Scalia’s dissent.  Its most famous passage is:

Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing: the potential of the asserted principle to effect important change in the equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive analysis. But this wolf comes as a wolf.

I have little doubt this case will be before the Supreme Court before long, and Scalia (and Olson) might at long last be vindicated on the nature of the Executive and on separation of powers in the Constitution.

John J. Vecchione is president and CEO at Cause of Action Institute.

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01/31/2018

Records show Richard Cordray scrambled in final days to name successor, thwart Trump’s nominee

The last-ditch coup by Richard Cordray was orchestrated despite apparent pushback from CFPB’s top attorney

Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) has uncovered documents that reveal Richard Cordray and his lieutenants, in Cordray’s last days as director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), scrambled to plan a gambit to usurp the president’s appointment authority and allow Cordray to name his own successor.

Cordray announced on November 15, 2017 that he would be stepping down as director of the CFPB, presumably to run for governor of Ohio.  Later that same day, the president announced his intention to appoint an acting director until a new director could be nominated and approved by the Senate.  Here’s where things get interesting.  On November 24, 2017, Cordray named the agency’s chief of staff, Leandra English, as the deputy director of the CFPB.  Then, he announced his resignation and tapped English as the acting director.

President Trump ignored this attempted unlawful action and appointed his own acting director, Mick Mulvaney.  Then the next day, the general counsel of the CFPB issued an opinion supporting the president and holding Mulvaney as the acting director.

Accordingly, as General Counsel for the Bureau, it is my legal opinion that the President possesses the authority to designate an Acting Director for the Bureau under the FVRA, notwithstanding § 5491(b)(5).

English, however, refused to back down, creating the absurd situation where a government agency had two people claiming to be acting director.  She sued in federal court, asking Judge Timothy Keller to make her acting director.  The court, however, denied her request, holding that “[d]enying the president’s authority to appoint Mr. Mulvaney raises significant constitutional questions.”  The agency, relying both on the opinion of its general counsel and the court’s decision, has recognized Mulvaney as the leader.  The Court case continues.  What follows is the result of CoA Institute’s investigation into the final weeks of Cordray’s tenure as director.

Internal CFPB communications reveal that on November 15, the date Richard Cordray announced his intent to retire, English forwarded Cordray a Politico Pro email that contained a report of the president’s intention to appoint an acting director.  A number of top CFPB employees were CC’d on this email, including General Counsel Mary McLeod.

The next substantial action came on November 22, when “RC” (presumably Richard Cordray) circulated an article from creditslips.com that outlines a legal argument for Cordray to appoint his own successor. Just two minutes later, Cordray sent another article from theintercept.com which, relying on the creditslips.com article, posits that David Silberman, then acting deputy director, should succeed Cordray.  The article notes “[t]he legal argument that Silberman would become interim director would be greatly improved if Cordray officially named him deputy director[.]”  CC’d on both these emails is General Counsel McLeod.  The full subject of Cordray’s email includes the line: “Mary [McLeod], need you to have people consider it further please[.]”

On the day of the formal resignation, November 24, documents revealed a scramble inside CPFB to properly time the gambit.  In an email thread titled “Possible presser” sent between Zixta Martinez, associate director for external affairs, Jennifer Howard, assistant director for communications, Kate Fulton, deputy chief of staff,[1] Cordray, and English, the group appears to discuss a document that is distinct from Cordray’s formal resignation announcement.  The group is concerned about the resignation going out before this “presser” document which, presumably, was the announcement of Leandra English as deputy director.

Later that day, in Cordray’s final letter to the staff, he made public his intention to name Leandra English as deputy director and his self-proclaimed successor.  The email below reveals that the agency wanted to wait until virtually the last minute to put this all into process.

Cordray’s team grappled with when, and in what order, to update the website.

And, finally, discussion of the order of the email to staff and the resignation letter.

English confirms:

The general counsel, Mary McLeod, was obviously aware that this is all going on, given that she was CC’d on virtually all of these emails, including the one above.  Yet, in the biggest blow to Cordray’s gambit, General Counsel McLeod sends a letter memo to the CFPB Leadership Team the very next day, November 25, with a concrete conclusion:

I advise all Bureau personnel to act consistently with the understanding that Director Mulvaney is the Acting Director of the CFPB . . . . Accordingly, as General Counsel for the Bureau, it is my legal opinion that the President possesses the authority to designate an Acting Director for the Bureau under the FVRA, notwithstanding § 5491(b)(5).

Elsewhere in her letter, McLeod states, “[t]his confirms my oral advice to the Senior Leadership team[.]”  Oral advice that the team ignored when they tried to install English.

To make matters worse, English continued to send emails claiming to be the Acting Director.  The first came in an email to the Senior Leadership Team, which included the General Counsel.

She made the same claim in an email to the staff of Senator Elizabeth Warren:

And finally in a staff-wide email.

This brazen attempt to commandeer an entire agency threatens the Constitutional Order.  Were Richard Cordray and Leandra English successful, they would have essentially created an agency that fell outside of any of the three branches of government.  As D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Brett Kavanaugh stated, the Director of the CFPB holds “enormous power over American business, American consumers, and the overall U.S. economy. [ ] The Director alone decides what rules to issue; how to enforce, when to enforce, and against whom to enforce the law[.]”[3]  Judge Kavanaugh concluded, “the Director enjoys more unilateral authority than any other officer in any of the three branches of the U.S. Government, other than the President.”[4]  Deciding who wields such awesome power should not happen in a series of harried emails between bureaucrats.  It should be decided by the President[5] and, when a permanent successor is ultimately named, the Senate confirmation process.[6]

Eric Bolinder is counsel at Cause of Action Institute.

 

[1] According to LinkedIn.

[3] PHH Corp v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and granted en banc review, Feb. 16, 2017.  The D.C. Circuit granted en banc review for this case, which automatically vacates Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion.  A decision is still pending.

[4] Id.

[5] See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 2. (the Appointments Clause).

[6] This author would like to note he agrees with Judge Kavanaugh that the overall structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional, regardless of who appoints the Director.

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01/30/2018

Commercial Speech Doctrine Needs an Overhaul

Cause of Action Institute joined with the Cato Institute and Competitive Enterprise Institute in filing an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to grant the petition for certiorari in CTIA v. City of Berkeley.  The commercial speech case involves an ordinance in Berkeley, California requiring cell phone retailers to make the following statement to their customers:

The City of Berkeley requires that you be provided the following notice:

To assure safety, the Federal Government requires that cell phones meet radio frequency (RF) exposure guidelines.  If you carry or use your phone in a pants or shirt pocket or tucked into a bra when the phone is ON and connected to a wireless network, you may exceed the federal guidelines for exposure to RF radiation.  Refer to the instructions in your phone or user manual for information about how to use your phone safely.[1]

The problem is that it is not entirely clear whether the harm described in this statement is actually true.  The current First Amendment commercial speech doctrine allows governments to compel commercial speech that is both “purely factual” and “uncontroversial.”[2]

The standard of review by which courts determine whether a particular compelled commercial statement meets this requirement can be the deciding factor in a case.  Take Berkeley, for example.  In this case, the record in the district court did “not offer[] any evidence that carrying a cell phone in a pocket is in fact unsafe.”[3]  That is, there is “no evidence in the record that the message conveyed by the ordinance is true.”[4]

Under any serious review of a governmental action impinging on a constitutional right—which compelled speech does—the absence of evidence to show that the government was indeed advancing a legitimate interest would be enough to strike down the ordinance.  But not in Berkeley.  The Ninth Circuit held that any “more than trivial” interest will suffice.[5]  No attention was paid to whether that interest, however trivial, is actually a legitimate one or if the compelled speech is advancing it.

The Supreme Court must step in

The commercial-speech doctrine is notoriously muddy.  Both Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg have recognized that the lower courts are in need of “guidance” on the “oft-recurring” and “important” subject of “state-mandated disclaimers.”[6]  And this guidance is necessary, the Justices wrote, because the Court has not “sufficiently clarified the nature and the quality of the evidence a State must present to show that the challenged legislation directly advances the governmental interest.”[7]

This lack of clarity has given rise to governments at various levels forcing commercial speakers to communicate disputed and politically charged statements, sometimes where the underlying factual issues are not resolved.  And lower courts are expanding government’s ability to commandeer commercial speaker’s message.  This contravenes the Constitution’s command that “Congress shall make no law” against free speech (incorporated against the states by the 14th Amendment).  This is precisely the type of behavior one would expect in a legal environment where the lines are not clear.

Commercial Speech Doctrine Must be Clear

The Supreme Court should grant the cert petition in Berkeley and ensure that moving forward when a government tries to compel commercial speech to carry the government’s message, the government must be able to, at a minimum, adduce evidence that (1) the purported harm actually exists, (2) mitigating that harm is a compelling government interest, (3) that the infringement on the speaker’s rights is narrowly tailored to advance that interest, and (4) that the compelled commercial speech actually does advance the interest.  We will continue to see doctrinal confusion and unnecessary compelled commercial speech absent that clarity, which should be avoided.

James Valvo is Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor at Cause of Action Institute.  You can follow him on Twitter @JamesValvo.

[1] Berkeley Municipal Code § 9.96.030(A).

[2] Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).

[3] CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, California, 854 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2017) (Friedland, J., dissenting in part).

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 1117.

[6] Borgner v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002) (Thomas, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

[7] Id.

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01/5/2018

The Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program

In August of 2016, Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request, seeking the following information about the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”):

Because of the agency’s failure to release records responsive to this request, CoA Institute filed a FOIA lawsuit on November 11, 2016. Recently, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) provided its 10th and final production. While CoA Institute is still in active litigation regarding this request, considering the new administration and its priorities, we thought it of value to discuss our findings to date. However, to fully understand the process, we believe that some background on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C., is necessary.

The Outer Continental Shelf and OCSLA background

The outer continental shelf is made up of “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters…and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” OCSLA was enacted on August 7, 1953 and governs the policies and procedures related to the OCS. Under  OCSLA, the Secretary of Interior (the “Secretary”) is responsible for the administration of mineral exploration as well as other OCS development (i.e., wind energy).[1] Further, through OCSLA, the Secretary may grant leases to the highest qualified responsible bidder based on sealed competitive bids.[2] OCSLA also provides guidelines for implementing an OCS oil and gas exploration and development program.[3] This program, the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, is commonly referred to as the “Five-Year Program”.

Specifications under the Five-Year Program

As provided in the OCSLA, the Five-Year Program shall have a schedule that indicates as precisely as possible, the size, timing and location of leasing activity best suited for national energy needs during the five-year period following its approval or re-approval.[4] In reviewing the five-year program, the BOEM looks at a variety of economic and environmental factors. The timing and location of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas on the OCS shall be based on consideration of eight factors.

These factors are:

“(A) existing information concerning the geographical, geological, and ecological characteristics of such regions; (B) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the various regions; (C) the location of such regions with respect to, and the relative needs of, regional and national energy markets; (D) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed, including fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sea-lanes, potential sites of Deepwater ports, and other anticipated uses of the resources and space of the outer Continental Shelf; (E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the development of oil and gas resources as indicated by exploration or nomination; (F) laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been specifically identified by the Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secretary’s consideration; (G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the outer Continental Shelf; and (H) relevant environmental and predictive information for different areas of the outer Continental Shelf.”

Further, the Five-Year Program provides that the Secretary shall request and contemplate input from federal agencies and the Governor of any State that could be affected under the proposed leasing program. Suggestions from local government executives in states that may be affected, which have been previously mentioned to the Governor of such State and any other person may also be considered. Under 43 U.S.C. §1331,  the term “person” includes, in addition to a natural person, an association, a State, a political subdivision of a State, or a private, public, or municipal corporation.

The Five-Year Program “process includes three separate comment periods, two separate draft proposals, a final draft proposal, a final secretarial proposal, and development of environmental impact statement (EIS).” This process, takes approximately two and a half years to complete. As mentioned above, input from federal agencies, state and local government, and any other person, may be considered. After the Secretary approves the program, the Proposed Final Five-Year Program is sent to the President and Congress. After at least sixty days, the Secretary may approve the program. The Department of Interior cannot offer an area for lease without it being included in an approved Five-Year Program.

The Secretary shall review the leasing program approved under this section at least once a year. After Secretarial approval, the geographic scope of a lease sale area can be narrowed, cancelled, or delayed without the development of a new program. The Secretary shall, by regulation, establish procedures for various steps in the management process. Such procedures will apply to various activities, including any significant revision or reapproval of the leasing program.

This series will continue next week with a comparison between the requirements outlined above and the process that took place during the 2017-2022 planning process.

Any questions, commentary, or criticisms? Please email us at kara.mckenna@causeofaction.org and/or katie.parr@causeofaction.org

Katie Parr is a law clerk and Kara E. McKenna is a counsel at Cause of Action Institute.

[1] Bureau of Energy Management, BOEM, https://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ (last visited January 3, 2018).

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

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12/19/2017

Politicizing FOIA review at the EPA and Interior

The Washington Post reported last week that “high-level officials” at the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) have started to “keep closer tabs” on incoming Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests for records that may be embarrassing or politically damaging to the Trump Administration.  Whether by deliberately delaying responses or conducting pre-production review of responsive records, non-career officials have been accused of politicizing FOIA.

Politicizing FOIA is Not New

Although concern over the improper interference by political appointees in the administration of the FOIA is justified, the practice did not originate with President Trump.  For example, according to two DOI Inspector General reports—dated September 2015 and October 2010—political appointees at Interior have long been routinely made aware of “selected” FOIA requests, including those “currently in litigation” or concerning “high profile or sensitive matters.”  In some instances, requests (including those from news media requesters) were “considerably delayed . . . possibly due to political involvement.”  Moreover, the EPA Inspector General, in August 2015 and January 2011, reported that EPA regulations specifically permitted some political appointees—including the agency’s Chief FOIA Officer and the authorized disclosure official in the Administrator’s Office—to participate in approving requests and redacting records.

The Obama-era

The truth is that politicizing FOIA reached its zenith under the Obama Administration.  Despite a professed commitment to transparency, President Obama introduced the pernicious practice of “White House equities” and “sensitive review” procedures at various agencies, including the Department of Treasury, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the EPA, the State Department, the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security.  As part of “sensitive review,” non-career political appointees direct career FOIA staff to consult with them whenever a FOIA request could elicit media attention or potentially embarrass the White House.  It is more than a bit ironic that the Washington Post—which previously described the Obama Administration as “one of the most secretive” ever because of its historic “stonewalling or rejecting” of FOIA requests—would now forget, or least fail to mention, this long, bipartisan history of presidents abusing transparency laws to their advantage.

Of course, none of this means that the Trump Administration is adhering to best practices.  It stands to reason that FOIA politicization, and a lack of overall commitment to transparency, continues.  For example, “White House equities” review persists.  In July 2017, the General Services Administration released to CoA Institute a previously-secret White House memo detailing those procedures, thus suggesting they are still in place.  Although not directly related to the FOIA, the White House also appears to have interfered with how agencies respond to congressional oversight requests.  And, most recently, CoA Institute has investigated the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s practice of identifying “high visibility” FOIA requests, as well as its tracking of requests concerning the Trump “transition.”

The current Administration is not alone in politicizing FOIA.  Where political appointees are interfering with the disclosure of records, they are continuing a long tradition of obstructing the public’s right to access government information.  To turn the issue into a partisan one—of Trump versus the EPA #Resistance, of #DrainTheSwamp versus the “main stream” media—obscures the underlying problem and makes it more difficult to reach consensus on how to fix it.

Ryan P. Mulvey is Counsel at Cause of Action Institute.

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