Archives for 2018

Senate finally confirms President Trump’s nominee for Intelligence Community watchdog

Last week, the Senate finally approved the nomination of former Department of Justice attorney Michael Atkinson to be Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.  We commended President Trump on his decision to name Mr. Atkinson as a watchdog back in November 2017.  According to one source, part of the long delay in the confirmation process was due to Senate negotiations with the Director of National Intelligence over the firing of Dan Meyer, the Intelligence Community’s whistleblower ombudsman.  Yet it is still a sad reflection of the current political climate that Mr. Atkinson’s nomination was pending for roughly six months.

As I have argued previously, one of the most troubling aspects of President Obama’s legacy was his failure to nominate permanent Inspectors General (“IGs”) at many agencies across the federal government.  Without presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed leadership, there is always a real danger that IG offices will lack the necessary commitment to transparency and accountability in government.  Indeed, Senator Ron Johnson has argued that “acting” IGs—who are typically career civil servants—risk being “not truly independent [because] they can be removed by the agency at any time; they are only temporary and do not drive office policy; and they are at greater risk of compromising their work to appease the agency or the president.”

When President Obama left office, twelve agencies lacked an IG.  During his first year in office, President Trump steadily moved to remedy this dearth of leadership, but the pace of new nominations slowed at the end of last year, and much more now needs to be done.  According to the Project on Government Oversight, which has been tracking IG vacancies since the Obama Administration, there are currently nine agencies without a permanent watchdog, six of which must be appointed by the White House.  This includes vacancies at major Cabinet-level agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  The Department of the Interior, sadly, continues to lack a permanent IG since the previous watchdog left office 3,374 days ago.

Of course, not all the blame should be placed on the inaction or slow decision-making of President Trump.  Aside from Mr. Atkinson’s recent confirmation, another four presidential nominations have been pending in the Senate for an average of 236 days.  When the White House has moved to fill these watchdog vacancies, the Senate should prioritize its consideration and the confirmation process.  Many Executive Branch agencies have substantial budgets, and presidentially-appointed IGs provide a vital internal check on waste, fraud, and abuse.

Ryan P. Mulvey is Counsel at Cause of Action Institute.

Federal Court Upholds Cigar Labeling Requirements — Why and What This Means

Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) has been active as an amicus curiae (friend of the court) in an ongoing federal lawsuit regarding cigars and other tobacco products.  Meaning, while we don’t represent any of the parties, we have been submitting briefs to help the Court reach its final decision. The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) originally proposed a burdensome tobacco-safety regulation that would have effectively crippled the premium cigar market, putting countless American small businesses out on the street.  After the 2016 election, however, new FDA leadership delayed that rule with the intent to change it. This was a wonderful development for both cigar companies and hobbyists alike. However, the FDA kept pushing a scaled-back rule that would require large, intrusive warning labels on premium cigar products.  We submitted a brief opposing that rule.

CoA Institute did not take a position on the efficacy or utility of tobacco warning labels.  Our concern was, as it frequently is, that agencies must show their work when they enact a new regulation.  The governing statute here, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“FTA”), required the FDA to show that any new regulations would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.  Plaintiffs, as well as CoA Institute, argued that the FDA had not done its work and, indeed, had conceded it had no real quantitative data or analysis for the efficacy of these new warning labels for cigar products.  Regulatory action for the sake of regulatory action is bad policy.

Unfortunately, the Judge disagreed, finding that the FDA had done its due diligence in determining that the warning labels would be effective.  He held that the FDA’s statements connecting the labels to public health, as well as their citation of certain data, such as the overall addictiveness of nicotine, was enough.  Furthermore, he found that the agency’s concession that it had no data available was merely an admission of the “agency’s inability to quantify the benefits of the Deeming Rule’s requirements prior to their implementation date.”  He held that a mere connection, quantifiable or not, between smoking prevention and the larger warning labels is enough.  He cited the agency’s prior work with other tobacco products, singling out cigarettes, as the foundation for the FDA’s contention that the new health warnings were appropriate and would affect cigar and pipe tobacco usage.

As any cigar aficionado knows, cigars and cigarettes are distinct products.  I regularly enjoy cigars, but I never touch cigarettes.  Why?  Because, in my opinion, the health risks are profoundly different for the two products.  More importantly, the addictive nature of the two is incomparable.  I regularly smoke cigars during the summer—which, for me, is 1-3 a week—and completely stop for the long winter months with no undesired effects or feelings of withdrawal.  That, to put it lightly, is not the usual experience with cigarettes.  Aficionados know: these are two different worlds.

Some might criticize me for relying on personal anecdotes to argue a federal regulation is unfounded.  I agree!  And that’s why the FDA should have conducted quantitative studies specific to premium cigars, rather than just relying on general science on nicotine addiction and the agency’s experience with a totally different product, cigarettes.  I suspect this is why Congress included language in the statute mandating that a “finding as to whether such regulation would be appropriate for the protection of the public health shall be determined[.]”  Of course, we live in the era of Chevron deference, where the Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute and, sometimes by extension, the agency’s own science (or lack thereof).  Accordingly, the agency’s own statements in support of the rule were given enormous deference by the Court.

The Plaintiffs in the case argued that it was ridiculous for the FDA to claim to not have access to quantitative data, since they’ve had “sixteen years and an entire nation’s worth of data to examine the efficacy of the [prior-implemented] FTC warnings.”  After all, most of the cigars produced and sold in the United States are subject to an FTC consent decree that requires these companies to put warning labels on their products.  The FDA could have studied the efficacy of the FTC warnings on cigar use, but failed to do so.  In rejecting this argument, the Judge made an interesting comment: “Plaintiffs, however, have identified no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that compelled the FDA to undertake such studies to make the findings required by [the statute].”  CoA Institute, as amici, did just that though.  We contended that Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Securities & Exchange Commission, which applied to similar statutory language in the financial sector, was controlling here.  The SEC made basically the same claim the FDA did, arguing “it was without a reliable basis” to determine costs associated with a regulation.  In Chamber, the D.C. Circuit recognized that limitations on data cannot “exclude the Commission from its statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it has proposed.” In its decision upholding the labeling rule, the District Court did not cite Chamber.

If this case were to be appealed—and, again, CoA Institute was just amici and did not represent any of the parties—we believe the D.C. Circuit would be faced with two interesting questions.  First, is the statutory language enforced by the Court in Chamber similar enough to the FTA that the case controls here?  And second, if Chamber does apply, can the FDA comply by simply reaching back and pointing to data based on cigarettes and other general science on tobacco?  We, of course, would argue no, given the distinct differences between premium cigars and cigarettes.

What does this all mean for cigar smokers?  Probably not that much, at least for now.  The original rule would have rocked the market, cutting off competition, reducing quality, and increasing prices exponentially.  The new, cutback rule might result in some increase in price, given the labeling costs cigar companies will now need to endure, but the same quality and quantity of cigars should be available for purchase.

But here’s the important point: there’s nothing preventing a future administration from bringing back the original rule.  And, given the Judge’s opinion in this case, the FDA would not have to reach a high bar to “deem” and regulate cigars the same way it does cigarettes.  This could be a death knell for the pastime.  The Courts and Congress must act to hold agencies accountable to good science and, most importantly, to doing their job.

*There were many other strong arguments made by the Plaintiffs, including Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional claims.  These were similarly rejected by the Court. For this blog post, I concentrated only on the arguments CoA Institute highlighted in our amicus brief.  The Court did vacate one part of the rule, which defined retailers who blend pipe tobacco in their stores as “manufacturers,” asking the agency to justify its reasoning.*

Justice Gorsuch Opines on Due Process and Civil Asset Forfeiture

In Sessions v. Dimaya,1 Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment of a fragmented Supreme Court but only in part of the plurality opinion by four other justices. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion to explain something he (but not the plurality) thinks is fundamental about due process. His concurring opinion highlights how civil cases, including forfeitures, now frequently impose harsher penalties than criminal prosecutions.

Dimaya involved federal statutes authorizing deportation of criminal aliens. The law designates specific crimes which, when an alien is convicted of them, allow nearly automatic deportation. It also has a “catch-all” provision that includes any felony that “by its nature” involves “substantial risk” of “physical force” against property or another person.2 The question in Dimaya was whether this catch-all provision was so vague that it did not provide fair notice about what crimes carry the risk of deportation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plurality (Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) and Justice Gorsuch answered Yes, and together they held the statute void for vagueness. Dimaya, the convicted alien, won; Attorney General Sessions lost.

Justice Gorsuch’s opinion about why the winner won takes a different tack than the plurality took. Civil asset forfeiture is key to understanding why.

Deportation, like most forfeitures, is a civil matter, even after an alien is convicted and even though deportation is “a particularly severe penalty which may be of greater concern to a convicted alien than any potential jail sentence.”3 More than one commentator quickly noted that Justice Gorsuch did not join the plurality’s opinion that “the most exacting vagueness standard should apply to removal cases, because the penalty of deportation is so severe.”4

That’s where Justice Gorsuch draws the line. “My colleagues suggest the law before us should be assessed under the fair notice standard because of the special gravity of its civil deportation penalty. But, grave as that penalty may be, I cannot see why we would single it out for special treatment when (again) so many civil laws today impose so many similarly sever sanctions.”5

Enter forfeiture.

Ours is a world filled with more and more civil laws bearing more and more extravagant punishments. Today’s “civil” penalties include confiscatory rather than compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be taken…. Some of these penalties are routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those associated with misdemeanor crimes—and often harsher than the punishment for felonies. And not only are punitive civil sanctions … rapidly expanding, they are sometimes more severely punitive than the parallel criminal sanctions for the same conduct. … Given all this, any suggestion that criminal cases warrant a heightened standard of review does more to persuade me that the criminal standard should be set above our precedent’s current threshold than to suggest the civil standard should be buried below it.

*             *             *

Why, for example, would due process require Congress to speak more clearly when it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien than when it wishes to … confiscate [a citizen’s] home? I can think of no good answer.”6

Tyler Arnold and I have made similar points here about civil asset forfeiture. Justice Gorsuch’s point is both broader (also touching civil commitments and broad business licensing requirements) and narrower (not foreclosing the possibility that particular civil forfeitures can meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause) than ours. So be careful what you wish for. A constitutional due process challenge to civil asset forfeiture generally could still come out exactly wrong at this Supreme Court.

Mike Geske is counsel at Cause of Action Institute

Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S.       , 138 S.Ct. 1204, 200 L. Ed. 549, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2497 (April 17, 2018).

2 See 18 U.S.C. §16(b); see also 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43).

3 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213, 200 L. Ed. at 558, 2018 LEXIS 2497 at * 15-16 (Kagan, J., plurality op.) (citations and quotations omitted).

4 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213, 200 L. Ed. at 557-58, 2018 LEXIS 2497 at * 15 (Kagan, J., plurality op.) (citations and quotations omitted).

5 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1231, 200 L. Ed. at 578, 2018 LEXIS 2497 at * 56 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (citations and quotations omitted).

6 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1229, 1231, 200 L. Ed. at 575-76, 578, 2018 LEXIS 2497 at *52-53, *56-57 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (citations and quotations omitted; emphases by Justice Gorsuch).

New Records Reveal the FAA Has Been Tracking FOIA Media Requesters

The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) was introduced to ensure public access to records of the Executive Branch.  Unfortunately, agency FOIA processes have long suffered from politicization at the hands of bureaucrats and political appointees who hope to frustrate the disclosure of embarrassing or newsworthy documents.  A recent report about enhanced “vetting” of FOIA requests at the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), for example, demonstrates the tenacity of those who govern—regardless of their political affiliation—to keep secrets from the concerned public.  Similarly, earlier this year, Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) revealed how the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration expanded its “sensitive review” procedures by putting records requests from attorneys, and requests concerning the Trump Administration’s transition period, into special processing categories.  Now, newly disclosed records from the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) demonstrate how that agency has made concerted efforts to keep tabs on news media requesters.

The FAA’s FOIA “Media Reports”

“Sensitive review” refers to the practice of giving certain FOIA requests extra scrutiny, usually because the records at issue are politically damaging, embarrassing, or otherwise newsworthy.  Politicization can come in different forms.  Sometimes sensitive review entails an agency’s public affairs team or communications specialists being kept informed of new requests or outgoing productions of records.  In other instances, it involves political appointees supervising searches or making redaction decisions.  In all cases, sensitive review delays, and sometimes prevents, the disclosure of records that the public has a right to view.

According to records obtained by former CoA Institute attorney Allan Blutstein, the FAA’s sensitive review process includes a “tracking system” for requests submitted by representatives of the news media.  News media requesters automatically receive a fee reduction under the FOIA and presumptively satisfy some of the requirements for expedited processing. This preferential treatment is meant to recognize the vital role of the media in a participatory democracy.  The intentional targeting of media requesters within a framework for sensitive review, therefore, is especially concerning.

The following screenshot from one of the FAA’s “Media Request” charts shows just how the agency tracks pending requests.  Each line includes a description of the records at issue and each request’s processing “status,” such as whether a search has been conducted or responsive records are under review.

Although approximately half of the requests recorded in the FAA chart (100 of 184) were submitted during the Trump Administration, the remainder date from as early as April 2009.  Not only does this reveal an unacceptable backlog at the FAA, but it suggests that the practice of targeting media requesters for special scrutiny or “tracking” may have originated with the Obama White House.  CoA Institute warned in early 2014 that FOIA processes across the government were being clogged up by political intervention because of news media requesters seeking the disclosure of records about embarrassing scandals.  It appears that the FAA’s current practice reflects the politicization that was covertly emphasized by the Obama Administration.

(A complete copy of the FAA tracking chart is available here.  FOIA requests highlighted in blue have not yet been assigned to a FOIA officer, while requests in yellow are, in most cases, pending legal, business or supervisor review.  An agency-created summary of the highlighted FOIA cases is available here.)

As a representative of the news media, CoA Institute itself was subject to the FAA’s tracking regime.  Three of our pending requests, dating from early 2012 and 2013, were flagged.  One of those three requests has not even been assigned to a disclosure officer for processing, despite the fact that it was submitted to the FAA almost five years ago.

The version of the FAA’s “Media Request” tracking table obtained by CoA Institute, which is dated April 26, 2018, was circulated amongst several officials within the FAA’s Office of Communications (“AOC”) and the Department of Transportation’s Office of the Secretary (“OST”).  The cover email also includes a batch of incoming record requests.  All of this suggests that a key group at the FAA is responsible for managing the sensitive review process and keeping key officials within the Administration knowledgeable about ongoing FOIA affairs.

A complete copy of this email is available here.  To the extent we have been able to identify the individuals involved, we believe they hold the following positions within the FAA’s FOIA Office, Office of Communications, or the Office of the Secretary of Transportation:

  • Kimberly McCormick – FOIA Management Specialist
  • Kathy Ray – Departmental FOIA Officer, Department of Transportation
  • Laura Brown – Deputy Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs
  • Gary Kolb – Chief of Staff, Communications Division
  • Greg Martin – Assistant Administrator for Communications
  • Elisabeth Smeda – Senior Advisor to the Acting Administrator
  • Collen Donovan – Senior Advisor to the Deputy Administrator
  • Carlos Alfaro – Director, Information and Technology
  • Geraldine Gour – Manager, Administrative Services for the Aircraft Certification Service
  • Duke Taylor – Manager, FOIA Program
  • Louis Fuss – Senior FOIA Management Specialist
  • Laurie Karnay – FOIA Management Specialist
  • Susan McLean – FOIA Management Specialist
  • Delphine Ndi – FOIA Analyst

A collection of the incoming FOIA requests attached to the email is available here.  Those requests were submitted by various reporters from Mother Jones, ABC, NBC, Fox10 News of Mobile, various local newspapers, and ProPublica.

The Problem of FOIA Politicization

Unfortunately, there is nothing unlawful about an agency keeping separate “tracking” notes on FOIA requests submitted by members of the media.  Nor is there anything unlawful in an agency keeping its communications officials, or even other parts of the Executive Branch, aware of incoming requests or outgoing records that could elicit media coverage or public inquiries.  But the sort of intentional tracking and obvious backlog that has become standard procedure at the FAA is unacceptable and clearly violates the spirit of the FOIA.  The fact that requests from the beginning of 2009 are still pending is inexcusable.  The real danger of politicization at the FAA should be self-evident.  When an agency is committed to treating media requesters in a special way, the tendency will always be to delay and obstruct disclosure, thus impairing FOIA rights and inhibiting the proper functioning of a critical media.

Ever since President Trump took office, the transparency community—including CoA Institute—has raised valid concerns about the White House’s coordinated effort to stifle transparency, both in the context of FOIA and with respect to congressional inquiries and oversight requests.  This is an unfortunate development, and CoA Institute remains committed to fighting for open government.  But insofar as the current Administration questions the value of President Obama’s legacy, it should commit itself to greater transparency.  The Washington Post described the Obama Administration as one of the “most secretive,” “most elusive,” and “most punitive toward whistleblowers and leakers who want to bring light to wrongdoing they have observed from inside powerful institutions.”  The Trump Administration should endeavor to do better.  No one should fear the disinfecting power of sunlight, and the federal government is always in need of some cleaning.

Ryan P. Mulvey is Counsel at Cause of Action Institute

Politics Clouding Criticism of the EPA’s Heightened Sensitive Review FOIA Procedures

Last week, a report from Politico revealed that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) maintains a burdensome “sensitive review” process for Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests concerning Administrator Scott Pruitt’s activities.  According to internal sources, officials within the Office of the Administrator have “reviewed documents collected for most or all FOIA requests regarding [Pruitt’s] activities[.]”  The Politico report further claims that this “high-level vetting” has increased, as compared with the policies and practices introduced during the Obama years.  “This does look like the most burdensome review process that I’ve seen documented,” argued Nate Jones from National Security Archive.

It is true that the Trump Administration has enhanced sensitive review processes at the EPA.  Other agencies have witnessed a similar expansion of sensitive review, as Cause of Action Institute’s investigation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration demonstrates.  But it would be a mistake—as I argued last December—to think that the Obama White House was any better at avoiding FOIA politicization.  The EPA has a long and terrible track record for anti-transparency behavior.  Consider the agency’s blatant weaponization of fee waivers.  According to data compiled by the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and reported by Reason and The Washington Examiner, the Obama EPA regularly denied public interest fee waivers to organizations critical of the agency’s regulatory activities and the White House’s policy agenda.  By contrast, left-leaning groups nearly always (92% of the time) received fee waivers.

In addition to this viewpoint discrimination, the EPA suffered other transparency scandals.  Former Administrator Lisa Jackson infamously used a fictional alter ego—“Richard Windsor”—to conduct agency business on an undisclosed government email account.  And the EPA “misplaced” over 5,000 text messages sent or received by former Administrator Gina McCarthy and other top officials.  The Obama-era EPA also tolerated the widespread use of personal email accounts by high-ranking bureaucrats, a practice that significantly frustrated public access to agency records and proved to foreshadow or parallel other FOIA scandals at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security, the Internal Revenue Service, and, most famously, the State Department.  It is noteworthy that, in March of 2015, The Guardian—hardly a right-leaning paper—could seriously ponder: “Is the EPA having a transparency crisis?

The history speaks for itself: the EPA under Scott Pruitt is not a new or unique threat to transparent government.  The litany of FOIA abuses at the EPA and other agencies under both Presidents Obama and Trump demonstrate that we should fight the tendency to view the problem of FOIA politicization through a partisan lens.  “Sensitive review” matured as a practice in the Obama Administration, and is continuing under President Trump, but there are institutional motivations for any and all bureaucrats, regardless of party affiliation, to frustrate the disclosure of records, particularly if they are embarrassing or raise the specter of media attention.

According to EPA Inspector General reports published in August 2015 and January 2011, the EPA’s FOIA regulations allow political appointees—including the Chief FOIA Officer and authorized disclosure official in the Office of the Administrator—to participate in approving requests and redacting records.  Is it any wonder that an agency follows its own long-established rules for processing requests it deems “sensitive”?  So long as the law gives the agency an opportunity to violate the spirit of the FOIA, the agency will take advantage of that discretion, even if it means violating statutory timelines for responding to requesters.

When Administrator Pruitt directed his staff to involve itself with the disclosure of records, he continued a tradition of obstructing the public’s right to access government information.  He deserves the criticism he has received.  But focusing on Administrator Pruitt’s (or President Trump’s) regulatory agenda, or his personal views on hot-button topics like global warming, obscures the underlying problem and makes it more difficult to reach consensus on how to address the real issues.  The FOIA and implementing regulations, for one, need to prohibit “sensitive review,” or at least provide serious restrictions on its implementation.  And guidance from the Department of Justice should address the troubling aspects that sensitive review can present.  This should be part of a solution that everyone who believes in transparency can accept.

Ryan P. Mulvey is Counsel at Cause of Action Institute

Litigation Update: Cause of Action v. Department of Justice and the House Financial Services Committee’s Attempt to Undermine the FOIA

In July 2017, Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) sued the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) after the agency refused to produce records under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) that would have revealed whether the Office of Information Policy (“OIP”) or Office of Legislative Affairs (“OLA”) were involved in implementing a controversial directive from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services.  CoA Institute’s FOIA request, which was filed in May 2017, followed reports that Jeb Hensarling, Chairman of the Financial Services Committee, directed twelve agencies—including, the Department of the Treasury and eleven other entities—to treat all records exchanged with the Committee as “congressional records” not subject to the FOIA.

As a result of litigation, DOJ identified sixteen pages of responsive records.  Eleven pages, which represent communications between an “unidentified Executive Branch agency” and DOJ, were withheld in full.  One additional record—an email between the Office of the White House Counsel and OIP—was partially redacted, but an attachment—a copy of Chairman Hensarling’s letter—was withheld in full.  DOJ defended its treatment of these records by invoking the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges.

Last Friday, CoA Institute moved for summary judgment, rebutting DOJ’s claims and arguing that the agency could not use the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges.  With respect to the White House email and attachment, DOJ failed to establish that an attorney-client relationship existed between the White House Counsel and OIP.  Assuming the requisite relationship did exist, the email still neither revealed private confidences nor solicited legal advice.  It also did not reflect a deliberative or consultative process.  Instead, the email was a literal “FYI”—the sort of informational notice that courts regularly compel agencies to disclose:

DOJ also wrongly withheld the email attachment—a copy of Chairman Hensarling’s letter—because the letter is already in the public domain and, in any case, does not reveal confidential information pertaining to the White House or DOJ.

Communications with the “unidentified Executive Branch agency” similarly cannot be exempt under the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges.  Although these records may contain legal advice on responding to Chairman Hensarling’s directive, they were shared outside of the Office of Legal Counsel, which is the DOJ component responsible for providing legal opinions to the White House and the rest of the Executive Branch.  To maintain attorney-client confidentiality, an agency must not circulate privileged material beyond those officials tasked with providing (or receiving) legal counsel.  Here, by involving OLA, which functions as DOJ’s congressional affairs office and does not serve as an “attorney” to other agencies, the “unidentified” agency waived any expectation of confidentiality.  Finally, DOJ misused the deliberative process privilege because it failed to explain how these inter-agency communications reflected DOJ’s recommendations or opinions or were otherwise non-factual.

Importantly, DOJ also failed to meet its burden under the new “foreseeable harm” standard.  Congress introduced this standard with the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 to codify the so-called “presumption of openness,” which discouraged the mere “technical” application of exemptions.  The FOIA, as amended, now requires an agency, such as DOJ, to explain how specific records can reasonably be foreseen to harm agency interests.  DOJ failed to provide a satisfactory argument in this case and did not even mention its obligations under the new standard.

* * *

The public deserves to know how, and to what extent, DOJ was involved in formulating and implementing Chairman Hensarling’s anti-transparency policy.  Because Congress is not itself subject to the FOIA, a request for records that have been exchanged with the legislative branch presents unique difficulties.  Nevertheless, the law requires that Congress manifest a clear intent to maintain control over specific records to keep them out of reach of public disclosure.  As I have argued previously, Chairman Hensarling’s directive is ineffective in this respect.  The mere fact that an agency possesses a record that relates to Congress, was created by Congress, or was transmitted to Congress, does not, by itself, render it a “congressional record.”  Any deviation from this acknowledged standard for defining a “congressional record” would frustrate the FOIA and impede transparent government.

The real-world implications of these sorts of congressional anti-transparency efforts are hardly imaginary or speculative.  The House Financial Services Committee has already intervened in a FOIA lawsuit to enforce its directive.  (That lawsuit is still ongoing.)  And CoA Institute is involved with a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service that involves a similarly overbroad effort by the Joint Committee on Taxation to sweep a range of agency records outside the scope of the FOIA.  CoA Institute has twice joined with other good government groups to express concern over these developments (here and here).  We are hopeful that the courts will put a stop to Congress’s games, and ensure public access to vital records revealing the interaction of the administrative state with the federal legislature.

CoA Institute’s brief is available here.

Ryan Mulvey is Counsel at Cause of Action Institute

CoA Institute Files Reply in Support of Motion to Order Enforcement Action in Colin Powell Email Case

Washington, D.C. – Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) today filed a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit that seeks to compel Acting Secretary of State John Sullivan and U.S. Archivist David Ferriero to fulfill their non-discretionary obligations under the Federal Records Act (“FRA”).  Specifically, CoA Institute has asked the Court to order Sullivan and Ferriero to initiate action through the Attorney General for the recovery of former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s work-related email records, which were hosted on a personal AOL account.  The brief also argues in opposition to Defendants’ recent motion to dismiss on grounds that Secretary Powell’s email has been “fatally lost.”

“Defendants have failed to undermine any element of CoA Institute’s motion for summary judgment,” the brief reads.  “The evidence they offer in support of their mootness claim does not establish fatal loss.  The record before the Court instead highlights Defendants’ complete refusal to turn to the law enforcement authority of the federal government or to investigate the possibility of forensically recovering the records at issue.”

CoA Institute President John Vecchione: “The Federal Records Act leaves Executive Branch officials no room for discretion in choosing when to recover unlawfully removed federal records. When an agency attempts to recover such records on its own, and those efforts prove ineffectual, the agency must go to the Attorney General.  The government bears a heavy burden in trying to avoid this obligation by establishing the ‘fatal loss’ of the records.  That burden has not been met here.”

Background

CoA Institute filed its lawsuit in October 2016. In January 2018, the court rejected the government’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit because of the State Department’s weak efforts at recovery of the emails in question. “The Defendants’ refusal to turn to the law enforcement authority of the Attorney General is particularly striking in the context of a statute with explicitly mandatory language,” U.S. District Court Judge Trevor McFadden opined.  “[T]here is a substantial likelihood that [CoA Institute’s] requested relief would yield access to at least some of the emails at issue.”

In September 2016, the House Oversight & Government Reform Committee held a hearing at which then-Under Secretary of State Patrick Kennedy testified that the State Department had undertaken minimal efforts to retrieve Powell’s work-related email.  After learning that Powell no longer had access to his AOL account or its contents, the State Department merely asked Powell to contact AOL to see if anything could be retrieved.  Despite a request from the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”) to contact AOL directly, the State Department never did so.  Ultimately, the agency relied on unreliable hearsay—namely, the reported representations of Secretary Powell’s personal secretary about an apparent phone conversation between someone at AOL and a staff member of the House Oversight Committee—to conclude that no records could be recovered.

—-  CoA Institute’s memorandum in support of its motion can be read here.

—-  CoA Institute’s reply brief can be read here.

About Cause of Action Institute

Cause of Action Institute is a 501(c)(3) non-profit working to enhance individual and economic liberty by limiting the power of the administrative state to make decisions that are contrary to freedom and prosperity by advocating for a transparent and accountable government free from abuse.

For more information, please contact Mary Beth Gombita, mbgcomms@gmail.com.