In a clear win for separation of powers and limited agency discretion, the D.C. Court of Appeals today ruled in favor of a company that challenged an EPA regulatory action issued in 2015 to require industry to replace its use of hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”). The Court found that “the fundamental problem for EPA is that HFCs are not ozone-depleting substances, and thus Section 612 would not seem to grant EPA authority to require replacement of HFCs.” This logic was supported by the EPA itself prior to 2015 when the agency openly deemed hydrofluorocarbons acceptable. But EPA reversed course in 2015 and concluded that some HFCs “could no longer be used by manufacturers in certain products, even if the manufacturers had long since replaced ozone-depleting substances with HFCs in accordance with the law.” EPA attempted to justify its position by classifying hydrofluorocarbons as a contributor to climate change.

The Majority opinion stated:

“Supreme Court cases that have dealt with EPA’s efforts to address climate change have taught us two lessons that are worth repeating here. First, EPA’s well-intentioned policy objectives with respect to climate change do not on their own authorize the agency to regulate. The agency must have statutory authority for the regulations it wants to issue. Second, Congress’s failure to enact general climate change legislation does not authorize EPA to act. Under the Constitution, congressional inaction does not license an agency to take matters into its own hands, even to solve a pressing policy issue such as climate change.”

The Court found that EPA’s legal interpretation to be “inconsistent with the statute as written,” and therefore vacated the 2015 Rule. The Court’s opinion speaks to the need for federal agencies to respect the separation of powers required by the U.S. Constitution and highlights the Judiciary’s important role to intervene when an agency oversteps its statutory authority.

Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) has repeatedly stressed this point in matters involving other rogue federal agencies.  For example, in a recent amicus curiae brief filed in support of a business facing a lawsuit filed by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) that we do not believe the FTC has statutory authority to bring, we argued:

“CoA is concerned that this case is part of an emerging pattern of ultra vires, unconstitutional FTC enforcement actions grounded in a fundamental error of statutory interpretation—specifically, the FTC’s apparent belief that it need not wait for Congress to pass legislation giving it permission to regulate broad swaths of the economy, so long as the FTC’s actions reflect its subjective vision of enlightened public policy—that not only flips basic administrative law on its head, but threatens the separation of powers vital to liberty.”

No agency can arrogate to itself legislative powers Article I of the Constitution reserves for Congress, no matter how important an agency thinks its policy aims might be.

Patrick Massari is Assistant Vice President at Cause of Action Institute