

AAAS is helping forge a similar relationship with amateur biologists, who number an estimated 4000 or more nationwide. An informal meeting this fall brought three of them together with You and others from the FBI, along with government and AAAS officials. The DIY speakers described how a love of science and commitment to public engagement has led them to hold exhibits at street fairs and form community labs.

Ellen Jorgensen, an assistant professor in pathology at New York Medical College and president of the Genspace community lab in New York City, acknowledged that cooperation with agents does not come easily for many in the DIY movement.

But, she said, "I think that the meetings we have had were very useful in terms of fostering some trust between the FBI and the DIY biocommunity . . . To kill a movement that embodies a reawakened public enthusiasm about science due to concerns about biosecurity would be a terrible shame."

—*Brian Vastag contributed to this report.*

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Anthony M. Boccanfuso, Ph.D.
Executive Director
The National Academies - UIDP

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b7C

www.uidp.org

Note - new email address - @uidp.net

2/2/11

1/2

From: @aaas.org]
Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2011 3:47 PM
To:
Cc:
Subject: Picking up dropped balls

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I'm sorry I haven't been more responsive in following up on our earlier conversations and your email below.

My ability to follow up on our initial discussions and send you a formal proposal has been complicated by the departure from my Center of one of my principal staffers - who had accompanied me (along with when we met with several of you last May. Given my Center's transition from being fully funded on a single block grant to having to find support for each specific project that we do, I will not be in a position to replace until we submit (and receive funding for) a major proposal we are preparing on verification and monitoring science in the context of arms control and nuclear security. Until we have secured sufficient funding to hire someone, I won't have the staff resources (or enough time of my own) to be able to do the work we had discussed with you as a standalone project.

However, I think we still have a way to proceed. As I believe I had mentioned to you when we first met, my Center has also been working with Special Agent in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate for some time on helping the FBI -- and in particular, helping WMD Coordinators -- engage with the biological science community. We had submitted a proposal to to fund a major project that will convene biannual meetings to bring together university research administrators, researchers, and other academic community representatives with a range of officials from the national security/law enforcement/intelligence communities. This project will also have the ability to spin up task forces to look at specific issues that require more focused treatment. Although the WMD Directorate is our immediate customer, the project has much wider applicability; we think that the forums and task forces we will be convening will be of interest to a wide variety of government, academic, and even private sector stakeholders.

tells us that the contract to support this work continues to advance through his procurement process, and he is hopeful it will be finalized soon. It only provides a portion of the funding needed to do this project, but it is a big enough portion for us to get started while we continue to raise funds. I believe that having the FBI contract in place will give other potential funders confidence that the project is really happening. Equally or more important, it will also establish a funding vehicle between the FBI and the AAAS that should make it much easier for other government sponsors to join the project. I hope they would be able to transfer money to the FBI to augment the project, rather than having to start the contracting procedure from scratch.

Since the objectives of this project are quite similar to the objectives of the work we had discussed with you -- provide an opportunity for the security/law enforcement community to gain a better understanding of, and work more effectively with, the research community, I believe that we can address the Counterintelligence Directorate's needs -- and in particular, it's training and awareness needs -- by augmenting this particular project.

Can I find some time for for the work we are doing with the WMD Directorate) and I come by to talk about this with you further? I would invite to join us as well, and look for a time that all three of us were available.

Again, I apologize for the delay in getting back to you, but I am hopeful that we will soon be in a position to work with you.

[redacted]

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>>> On 9/15/2010 at 4:20 PM, in message <89CF247A7EDFD24F95485E4020D3FBEF5D477212F0@fbi-exvme-11.FBI.GOV>, [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov wrote:

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[redacted]

Thanks for getting back so quickly. We're ready whenever you are, so please don't feel any pressure.

We have a number of meetings coming up. Our next National Security Business Alliance Council meeting is on 9/29; our annual Strategic Partnership Coordinators meeting will be held from 10/12-15 in San Diego; while our next Academic Alliance/National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB) meeting will be held on 10/28 at our HQ.

I'm thinking it might be more useful at this point to try and attend the NSHEAB meeting first, and then continue to work our way out from there. Space will be limited, so please advise if this interests you. The WMDD Assistant Director and UC [redacted] have attended in the past.

Best, [redacted]

From: [redacted]@aaas.org>
To: [redacted]
Sent: Wed Sep 15 15:18:57 2010
Subject: Re: FW: Concept paper on Support for FBI Academic Alliances

[redacted] thanks for contacting me about that. The ball is in my court and has been for a while. I need to pick it up and start dribbling it - I hope to get back to you relatively soon on that.

When I came by to meet with you, you had mentioned a few dates when your coordinators or Alliances would be meeting later in the year - one being a meeting of the Business Alliance from October 12-15. There wouldn't be enough time between now and then to make a presentation on anything that had been produced in the project described by this concept paper -- which of course has yet to get approved, much less started. However, if it would be useful for me to participate in one of these meetings, either to talk about the work we do at the Center or to become more familiar with your programs, I'd be happy to try to do so.

[redacted]

>>> [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov> 9/15/2010 11:01 AM >>>

Hi, [redacted]

I know it's been awhile, but [redacted] and I were wondering if this was still moving ahead at AAAS or if we can

provide any more support.

Best, [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

FBIHQ

[redacted]

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[redacted] (Desk)

[redacted] Blackberry)

[redacted]@ic.fbi.gov

From: [redacted]@aaas.org>

To: [redacted]

Sent: Tue Jun 22 10:35:20 2010

Subject: Concept paper on Support for FBI Academic Alliances

[redacted] it was good to talk to you last month and learn more about the academic alliances and other partnerships that the FBI is currently engaged in. I'm sorry it's taken so long to get back in touch with you.

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AAAS has an internal process to review activities that AAAS units propose to do for outside organizations, or to go over proposals that they are considering submitting in response to calls or requests. The first step in this process is review of a concept paper that sketches out what the relationship or proposal will address. The attached two-pager was the one I circulated through that process describing work we hoped to do for you. It was enthusiastically approved -- our senior management welcomed the possibility for my unit to do this kind of work. I'd like to continue our discussions to get a clearer idea of exactly what we might do together, from which I can prepare a more detailed proposal and budget to discuss with you (after putting it through the second stage of our review process).

Note that in this paper I have suggested a few different areas in which I believe we can help support the NSHEAB and other partnerships, including but not limited to the training activities we talked about during our visit. These are only meant to be illustrative - we can pick up on any of these to discuss further, or come up with other areas that are not listed here.

Note that we are also continuing our discussions with [redacted] about activities that would specifically support the WMD Directorate. The activities described here would complement those, but would be an independent project.

Can I schedule a time to talk about this further? We're looking forward to working with you.

[redacted]

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AAAS
FOLLOW-UP

7/7/10
2:00

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]@aaas.org
Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2010 10:35 AM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: Concept paper on Support for FBI Academic Alliances
Attachments: AAAS support for FBI Academic Alliances.pdf

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b7C

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Support for FBI Academic Alliances

AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy

The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts several outreach efforts to engage the academic community on topics within its jurisdiction, including counterterrorism and counterintelligence. The AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy is already working with the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate on issues at the intersection of biological research, biotechnology, and national security and has proposed to do more. However, many other initiatives in other parts of the FBI have similar needs for an organization such as CSTSP that bridges the research, security, and law enforcement communities.

In particular, the FBI's Counterintelligence Division maintains the Academic Alliance, a strategic partnership with the academic community for the purpose of "sharing information and establishing a dialogue with academic institutions to increase awareness of threat and national security issues in order to foster a spirit of cooperation." There are two components to this Alliance – the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB), comprised of the Presidents or Chancellors of about 20 of the nation's leading public and private research institutions, which meets regularly to provide a forum for FBI and academic leadership to discuss issues of mutual concern; and the College and University Security Effort, through which the FBI Special Agents in Charge of a regional office meet with the heads of local colleges and universities to discuss national security issues. Both of these efforts have improved communications between the FBI and academia. However, it is not clear to what extent either of these efforts has its own source of analytical support or a set of connections to others in the national security, law enforcement, academic, and research communities who have similar interests and concerns. CSTSP can provide both, and it can do so particularly effectively given its ongoing activities with many of the same players in its biosecurity work with the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate.

The FBI engages in similar strategic partnerships, through its Business Alliance, with national security contractors who are performing classified research for the US government. It does not appear to have a formal program engaging private industry that is doing unclassified work, a sector which is responsible for much of the nation's technological innovation and which shares many of same issues involving the national security implications of fundamental research that arise in academia. CSTSP can help the FBI reach out to this sector as well.

Specific Activities

CSTSP proposes to enter into a relationship with the Counterintelligence Division to support its Academic Alliance activities and explore the need either for extending its Business and Academic Alliance efforts to reach a broader share of the high-tech industry, or to develop a parallel effort. These support activities could include the following:

- Providing analytic support for the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board. The presidents and chancellors who sit on the NSHEAB may have personal experience or anecdotal evidence of particular problems at the law enforcement/academia interface. It may prove very useful to this Board's operations if it had the ability to ask for research or analytic support to gauge the extent, or the implications, of topics that come to NSHEAB attention.
- Providing training for those Special Agents in FBI field offices who have the mission of working with academic and high tech industry institutions to improve their awareness of, and ability to work effectively with, officials in those sectors. Such training would probably be provided as a half-day or one-day augmentation to a meeting of these liaison officers scheduled for some other purpose. FBI officials and other law enforcement officers may consider academics naive, in that they welcome open interaction with foreign visitors on technical topics with security relevance, notwithstanding the fact that these visitors may be working for intelligence organizations or terrorist groups. FBI officials may not appreciate the importance of open engagement with the world's best students and researchers in maintaining world-class technical competence, or the practical challenges that universities would face in trying to draw distinctions among which unclassified research topics could be shared with which students. CSTSP will provide training, of a duration and at a location to be discussed with Counterintelligence Division staff, for these liaison officers. Note that these officers are different from, but in many ways have a similar mission to, the Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Coordinators in each FBI Field Office who have the mission of engaging local institutions or entities that may be working with technologies relevant to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. CSTSP is already working with WMD Coordinators and can serve to bridge two related but formally distinct efforts within the FBI, lending greater efficiency to both.
- Conducting outreach in academic and research organizations to assess the effectiveness of FBI engagement. The FBI's recognition of the need to reach out to academic and law enforcement communities is admirable, but a neutral third party may be in a better position to assess the effectiveness of those efforts.
- International Outreach. The FBI's activities described here are purely domestic – yet many of the issues at stake are inherently international. With its set of international contacts in both scientific and security communities, CSTSP offers the FBI the ability to reach out internationally in those cases where such a perspective is important

Budget

Preliminary discussions with Counterintelligence Division officials have indicated their interest in engaging CSTSP to help support its academic and research community outreach efforts, including in particular its training activities. Through an iterative process of ascertaining their needs and estimating costs to meet them, we can arrive at more specific budget numbers.

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@aaas.org]

Sent: Friday, July 16, 2010 1:22 PM

To: [REDACTED]@aau.edu; [REDACTED]@asmusa.org; [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]@nas.edu; [REDACTED]@od.nih.gov; [REDACTED]@ostp.eop.gov;
 [REDACTED]@ttu.edu; [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]@dubno.com

Subject: Invitation to discuss the role of the technical community in detecting illicit activity

You are invited to participate in an exploratory discussion of the role of, and mechanisms for, technical professionals to identify, call attention to, and/or investigate efforts to abuse science and technology for the purpose of inflicting great harm. I would like to see when, in the weeks of July 26 or August 2, you might be able to participate in a three-hour meeting for this purpose.

In a world of globalized dual-use science and technology, the same technical capabilities that are rapidly expanding in scope and accessibility to advance human welfare also have the inherent capability to be used maliciously. There may be little or no outwardly observable "signature" that characterizes malicious activity, making it extremely difficult for national law enforcement or intelligence agencies to survey technical activity worldwide and find very rare illicit activities amidst a vast legitimate background. This is not a problem that can be solved by "remote sensing" from afar.

Those in the best position to identify illicit technical activity may be others in the technical community, who have a better understanding of the science and technology, and greater access to those who are doing it, than the security and intelligence communities will ever have. However, today there are no generally accepted mechanisms or procedures by which those with suspicions about illicit activity can safely call that work to the attention of those who can do something about it.

The Hourglass Initiative (hourglassinitiative.com) represents one approach to address this problem. It seeks to promote codes of conduct, develop and employ secure web-based anonymous technologies to allow those with knowledge of illicit activity to publicize it, and encourage scientists, journalists, and others to investigate such activities. I would like to invite you to participate in a discussion with Dan Dubno, an Emmy-award winning producer formerly with CBS news and the Initiative's founder and Executive Director, to explore some of the implications of this approach. If this isn't the right approach, let's talk about what would be. But if no such approach is acceptable, one has to explain how the alternatives -- giving up, or letting governments try to do this by themselves (in ways that would very likely adversely affect the technical community) -- are preferable.

This will be a quick first look at this initiative, primarily drawing on people in the DC area. If the discussion is promising, I will reach out more broadly for future discussions.

I hope you will be able to join us. Please let me know which of the following blocks of time you could NOT attend. (Also, please get back in touch with me before transferring this invitation.)

Monday, July 26, afternoon (1-4 PM)
 Tuesday, July 27, morning (9-12 AM)
 Thursday, July 29, morning or afternoon
 Friday, July 30, afternoon
 Monday, August 2, morning or afternoon
 Tuesday, August 3, morning or afternoon
 Wednesday, August 4, morning or afternoon
 Thursday, August 5, morning or afternoon
 Friday, August 6, morning or afternoon

7/16/2010

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