

NO ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 13-5335

CAUSE OF ACTION,

Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee.

CORRECTED BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RONALD C. MACHEN JR.,
United States Attorney.

R. CRAIG LAWRENCE,
ALAN BURCH
Assistant United States Attorneys.

C.A. No. 12-0850

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

Parties

The Appellant is Cause of Action (“COA”), who was the Plaintiff in the District Court. The Appellee is the Federal Trade Commission, who was the Defendant in the District Court. The *amici curiae* are the Daily Caller News Foundation (with leave of the Court) and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (with consent), on behalf of itself and Stephens Media LLC, North Jersey Media Group Inc., National Public Radio, Inc., National Press Photographers Association, Investigative Reporting Workshop at American University, and the First Amendment Coalition.

Rulings Under Review

The final judgment under review was entered on September 12, 2013. The issues on appeal were addressed in the August 19, 2013, Memorandum Opinion and Order by the Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan, granting in part and denying in part the Federal Trade Commission’s motion for summary judgment, which is reported at 961 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.D.C. 2013).

Related Cases

This case has not previously been before this Court and there are no currently pending related cases.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iv
RELEVANT STATUTORY EXCERPTS.....	vii
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.....	1
ISSUES PRESENTED.....	1
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE	2
I. Statutory Background for Fee Waivers and Reductions Under FOIA.....	3
II. COA’s First FOIA Request (August 2011) (FOIA-2011-01431).....	4
III. COA’s Second FOIA Request (Nov. 2011) (FOIA-2012-00227).....	9
IV. COA’s Third FOIA Request (February 2012) (FOIA-2012-00687) ..	11
V. The District Court’s Ruling	13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	15
ARGUMENT	16
I. Standard of Review.....	16
II. The District Court Correctly Held that COA Did Not Qualify as a Representative of the News Media for FOIA Requests One and Two.....	17
A. A FOIA Requester Bears the Burden of Establishing That It Qualifies as a Representative of the News Media.....	17

- B. COA Failed to Satisfy its Burden of Showing a “Distinct Work” It Planned to Create from Either its First or Second Requests.20
- C. COA Failed to Satisfy its Burden of Showing That It Could Adequately Distribute its Distinct Work to a Sufficiently Broad Audience.24
- D. Purported Representatives of “Alternative” News Media Must Still Meet the Established Standards.29
- III. The District Court Correctly Held that COA did not Qualify for a Public Interest Fee Waiver for Requests One and Two33
 - A. A FOIA Requester Bears the Burden of Establishing That Its Request Will Further the Public Interest33
 - B. COA Failed to Show that Its Disclosures Would Contribute to Understanding by the Public at Large36
 - C. COA’s Request for a Public Interest Fee Waiver for its Second Request Fails for the Additional Reasons that It Would Not Significantly Contribute to Public Understanding and was in COA’s Commercial Interests40
- IV. The District Court Correctly Held that COA’s Fee Waiver Request in Connection with its Third FOIA Request was Moot Because the FTC Located Fewer than 100 Pages of Responsive Records, and Released These Records to COA Free of Charge.....42
- CONCLUSION45
- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.....46
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE46

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

<i>Amobi v. D.C. Department of Corrections</i> , __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2895933 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014).....	42
<i>Better Government Association v. Department of State</i> , 780 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1986)	36
<i>Brown v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Off.</i> , 226 Fed. App'x 866, 868 (11th Cir. 2007)	17, 40
<i>Carney v. U.S. Department of Justice</i> , 19 F.3d 807 (2d Cir. 1994)	39
<i>Electric Privacy Information Ctr. v. Department of Defense</i> , 241 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003)	19, 32
<i>Federal CURE v. Lappin</i> , 602 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.D.C. 2009)	35
<i>Federal Commc'ns Commission v. Schreiber</i> , 381 U.S. 279 (1965).....	19
<i>Forest Guardians v. Department of Interior</i> , 416 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2005).....	36
<i>Friends of the Coast Fork v. U.S. Department of the Interior</i> , 110 F.3d 53 (9th Cir. 1997).....	34
<i>Hormel v. Helverling</i> , 312 U.S. 552 (1941).....	30
<i>Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice</i> , 365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004)	33, 34
<i>Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin.</i> , No. 1:98CV2223 (RMU), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22872 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2000).....	38, 39
* <i>Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti</i> , 326 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2003)	16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26, 34, 35, 40
<i>Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice</i> , 122 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2000)	17, 21

<i>Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice</i> , 185 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2002)	17, 21
<i>Larson v. Central Intelligence Agency</i> , 843 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1988).....	34, 35
<i>McClain v. Department of Justice</i> , 13 F.3d 220 (7th Cir.1993)	36
<i>McClellan Ecol. Seepage Situation v. Carlucci</i> , 835 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1987).....	35, 36, 42
<i>NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.</i> , 437 U.S. 214 (1978).....	42
* <i>National Sec. Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense</i> , 880 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1989)	17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 31
<i>National Treasury Emp. Union v. Griffin</i> , 811 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .	34, 35, 41
<i>Oglesby v. U.S. Department of Army</i> , 920 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990)	35
<i>Renegotiation Board v. Bannerkraft Clothing Co.</i> , 415 U.S. 1 (1974)	42
<i>Research Air, Inc. v. Kempthorne</i> , 589 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009)	42
<i>Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.</i> , 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992)	30
<i>Rozet v Department of Housing & Urban Development</i> , 59 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 1999)	42

* Cases chiefly relied upon are marked with asterisks.

FEDERAL STATUTES

5 U.S.C. § 552.....	1, 2
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i)	37
5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)	2, 4, 17, 18, 20, 24
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)	2, 4, 33, 37

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii)	17, 23
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(iii).....	41
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).....	10
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).....	10
28 U.S.C. § 1291	1

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)	4, 10
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(2) (2012)	19
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3).....	2, 5, 43
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(6).....	5
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e).....	4
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e)(2)	33, 37
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e)(2)(ii)	35, 42
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3).....	5
16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3).....	2
79 Fed. Reg. 15,680-01 (Mar. 21, 2014) (SA-015)	29

MISCELLANEOUS

153 Cong. Rec. S10,988 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007).....	31, 32
--	--------

RELEVANT STATUTORY EXCERPTS

5 U.S.C. §552 (a)(4)(A)(ii)

In this clause, the term “a representative of the news media” means any person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience. In this clause, the term “news” means information that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public. Examples of news-media entities are television or radio stations broadcasting to the public at large and publishers of periodicals (but only if such entities qualify as disseminators of “news”) who make their products available for purchase by or subscription by or free distribution to the general public. These examples are not all-inclusive. Moreover, as methods of news delivery evolve (for example, the adoption of the electronic dissemination of newspapers through telecommunications services), such alternative media shall be considered to be news-media entities. A freelance journalist shall be regarded as working for a news-media entity if the journalist can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through that entity, whether or not the journalist is actually employed by the entity. A publication contract would present a solid basis for such an expectation; the Government may also consider the past publication record of the requester in making such a determination.

5 U.S.C. §552 (a)(4)(A)(iii)

Documents shall be furnished without any charge or at a reduced charge below the fees established under clause (ii) if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.

5 U.S.C. §552 (a)(4)(A)(vii)

In any action by a requester regarding the waiver of fees under this section, the court shall determine the matter de novo: *Provided*, That review of the matter shall be limited to the record before the agency.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A	Appendix page numbers
COA	Cause of Action, Plaintiff-Appellant in this case
DCNF	Daily Caller News Foundation, Amicus in this case
EPIC	Electronic Privacy Information Center, a litigant in a cited case
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FTC	Federal Trade Commission, Defendant-Appellee in this case
RC	The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
SA	Corrected Addendum page numbers, attached to COA's Corrected Brief, filed May 6, 2013

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Appellee, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), agrees that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and that the appeal was timely.

ISSUES PRESENTED

In the opinion of the FTC, this appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the District Court correctly held that COA did not qualify for a fee reduction as a “representative of the news media” for its first and second FOIA requests, because it failed to establish that it would create a “distinct work” from the requested records or had an ability to distribute that work to a sufficiently large audience.

(2) Whether the District Court correctly held that COA did not qualify for a public interest fee waiver for its first and second FOIA requests, because it failed to establish an ability to disseminate that information to a reasonably broad segment of the public, and because the information sought would not contribute significantly to public understanding of the activities of the government.

(3) Whether the District Court correctly found the fee waiver issue in connection with COA’s third FOIA request was moot because the FTC located fewer than 100 pages responsive to COA’s request and, therefore, released all

non-exempt responsive records to COA free of charge.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal involves three requests made by plaintiff COA for waivers of fees normally imposed on persons requesting records under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 *et seq.* Between August 2011 and February 2012, COA made three FOIA requests and, each time, requested both a public interest fee waiver and a fee reduction as a “representative of the news media,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii), 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). The FTC denied fee waivers as to the first two FOIA requests and classified COA as an “[o]ther [noncommercial]” requester. A.028; A.050. As to the third, the Commission declined to act on the fee waiver request, because the non-exempt records that were responsive to the non-duplicative portion of that request amounted to fewer than 100 pages, and they were therefore provided without charge, in accordance with the FTC’s Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3). The Commission denied COA’s appeals of its various fee determinations. A.035-36; A.040; A.161-64; A.185-86.

On May 25, 2012, COA filed a complaint challenging both the FTC’s failure to disclose certain requested information and the FTC’s denial of COA’s fee waiver and reduction requests for all three FOIA requests. A.007-19. The FTC moved for summary judgment, A.187-259, and, on August 19, 2013, the District

Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part the FTC's motion. A.373-418. The District Court held that the FTC had properly denied COA's requests for fee waivers and reductions for FOIA requests one and two, that the fee waiver request for the third request was moot, that the FTC had properly withheld internal memorandum under FOIA Exemption 5, but ordered the FTC to produce two screen shots of COA's website. After the FTC produced the screen shots, the parties consented to entry of a final appealable judgment, which the court did on September 12, 2013. A.419.

On November 12, 2013, COA filed a timely appeal to this Court. A.420.

I. Statutory Background for Fee Waivers and Reductions Under FOIA

Federal agencies (and thus taxpayers) necessarily incur expenses in responding to FOIA requests. The FOIA establishes a fee structure that varies with the status of the person or entity making the request:

- “commercial use” requesters are charged fees associated with the agency's direct costs to search for, review, and duplicate responsive documents.
- educational institutions, non-commercial scientific institutions, and representatives of the news media, are assessed only duplication fees.
- “other requesters” that do not fit into the aforementioned categories are charged for the search and duplication, but not review, of responsive documents.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii); *see also* 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b). Moreover, an agency may waive all fees or reduce fees associated with a FOIA request if a requester can show that “disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.”

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii); *see also* 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e).

II. COA’s First FOIA Request (August 2011) (FOIA-2011-01431)

COA described itself as “a 501(c)(3), not-for-profit, educational organization,” “that uses public policy and legal reform strategies to ensure greater transparency in government, protect taxpayer interests and promote social and economic freedoms.” A.020-21; A.406. It was created on August 15, 2011. COA Brief at 6, 27; A.031. Fifteen days after COA was formed, and when it was still known as the “Freedom Through Justice Foundation,” it submitted a FOIA request to the FTC seeking access to four categories of records related to the FTC’s “Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising” – a publication that the FTC had revised in 2009 to include “social media and bloggers.” A.020-21; A.222-23 ¶ 6; A.375.

COA subsequently agreed to narrow its FOIA request to the first category, which sought: “[a]ll records relating to the drafting, formulation, and revision of the [Guides]” from January 1, 2009 through September 6, 2011. A.020; A.024;

A.223 ¶ 7; A.242 ¶¶ 9,10. It also requested “a complete waiver of both search fees and duplication fees” under the public interest exception. A.021. The FTC denied that request on September 22, 2011, because COA’s conclusory statement regarding its entitlement to such waiver failed to show how disclosure of the requested records would be “likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations and activities of government.” A.025; A.223 ¶7.

COA recast itself as a “representative of the news media and public interest firm” in a follow-up letter on September 26, 2011. A.026; A.223 ¶ 8; A.242 ¶ 12. The weeks-old organization claimed that it “is organized and operated to publish or broadcast news to the general public,” and asserted without support or details that it would “use its editorial skills to turn raw materials into a distinct work.” A.026

On October 7, 2011, the FTC denied both of COA’s fee waiver requests because COA had “not demonstrated [its] ability [to] disseminate information to the general public.” A.028; A.223-24 ¶ 9. The FTC nevertheless released 100 pages of responsive records, which COA was entitled to receive free of charge as an “[o]ther [noncommercial] requestor” under the FTC’s rules of practice, 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3).¹ A.028; A.224 ¶ 9; A.243 ¶¶ 14-15.

¹ The October 7, 2012 letter, A.028, miscites to 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(6), which is the general “[s]chedule of direct costs,” whereas 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3) refers specifically to charges for “[o]ther requesters.”

COA appealed the denial of its public interest fee waiver request on October 28, 2011. A.029-34; A.224 ¶ 10. In its appeal, COA's only effort to show its ability to disseminate information was its claim that its "primary purpose for use of information obtained through FOIA is to provide the information to the public through our website and the media. The [COA] website publicizes its findings and our investigative efforts have earned media attention." A.030. It did not appeal the FTC's denial of its request for a fee reduction as a "representative of the news media." *See* A.035 n.1.

The FTC denied COA's appeal on November 29, 2011. A.035; A.224-25 ¶ 11. In that denial letter, the FTC emphasized that COA still had not shown that it could adequately relay the information the FTC provided to the public. The FTC noted that, although COA claimed broadly that it could "provide information to the public through [COA's] website," that website was not even functioning at the time of appeal.² A.035 n.2; A.371 ¶ 6. Nor had COA demonstrated its ability to disseminate information by any other means, such as a functioning newsletter or a mailing list. The letter also advised COA that "a vast amount of information regarding the Endorsement Guides' effect on social medial authors" was publicly

² Specifically, the FTC noted that "a previous review of your organization's website, which now appears to be offline and 'Under Construction,' and other news media's references to your organization did not show sufficient evidence regarding plans to disseminate the requested information." A.035 n.2.

available, such that “it is unlikely that the documents produced pursuant to your FOIA request would contribute ‘significantly’ to the public understanding of the FTC’s operations or activities” A.036.

COA sought reconsideration of the denial of its appeal by letter dated December 12, 2011. A.037-39; A.226 ¶ 14. Rather than offer any new information about its dissemination abilities, COA asserted that it had already met its burden of proof by identifying four news stories that COA did not author and by “not[ing] specifically that ‘the [COA] website publicizes its findings’” A.038. It did not claim any other method of dissemination. On December 20, 2011, the FTC denied that reconsideration request, concluding that COA had again failed to “describe the future work that will result from the disclosure of the requested materials,” or that it had the ability to convey that work to the general public. A.040; A.226 ¶ 14.

On January 27, 2012, COA submitted another request for reconsideration in support of its public interest fee waiver request and to be considered a “representative of the news media” for its first FOIA request (as well as for its second FOIA request, described below). A.152-60; A.227 ¶ 16. Regarding its dissemination abilities, COA simply stated that it would share the analysis of its request to the public through unspecified “memoranda, reports, or press releases,” that it would “disseminate any documents it acquires from these requests” on its

website; that it would “disseminate information” through its “online newsletter and other publication activities,” or through various media contacts that had supposedly published COA’s work in the past. It also claimed it should receive a fee reduction as a representative of the news media because it had published information on Facebook and Twitter and through an email newsletter. A.154-55; A.158-59.

The FTC denied this reconsideration request on February 27, 2012.

A.161-64. It specifically noted that COA had “failed to provide any meaningful level of detail regarding your organization’s dissemination efforts or ability, aside from an ambiguous promise to share an analysis of the materials with the public in some form,” or any details about the “distinct work” it intended to publish.

A.161-62. Further, it noted that COA had provided “no information about the newsletter or its audience,” and that its claims of media contacts were insufficient “in light of [COA’s] failure to provide information regarding the possibility that such contacts would disseminate the requested information.” A.162. Moreover, the FTC noted that COA’s “website only contains the original FOIA requests with no information about the results of those requests.” *Id.* With respect to its request for news media representative status, the FTC concluded that COA had failed to provide sufficient details about its ability to turn “raw materials into a distinct work,” or its ability to “distribute[] that work to an audience,” and that its

website did not provide sufficient evidence of such an ability. A.163 (citation omitted).

III. COA's Second FOIA Request (Nov. 2011) (FOIA-2012-00227)

While COA's initial appeal on its first FOIA request was pending, it submitted a second, conditional FOIA request. In a letter dated October 28, 2011, COA requested that – in the event the FTC denied its appeal for a public interest fee waiver for its first FOIA request – the FTC then release two categories of records: (1) all FOIA requests for which the FTC granted fee waivers under the public interest exception since January 1, 2009, and (2) documents referring or relating to the process in which the FTC determined such FOIA requests met the fee waiver criteria. A.031; A.224 ¶ 10; A.243-44 ¶ 16. The FTC denied COA's appeal of the fee waiver denial for its first FOIA request on November 29, 2011. A.035-36; A.224 ¶ 11; A.244 ¶ 17. By letter dated December 2, 2011, FTC's FOIA Unit acknowledged as of November 30, 2011, receipt of COA's second, conditional request (designated as FOIA Request no. 2012-00227) and sought a fee agreement to process this request. A.044; A.225 ¶ 12; A.244 ¶ 18.

On December 12, 2011, COA responded requesting both a public interest fee waiver and a fee reduction as a representative of the news media for this second request. A.045-49; A.225-26 ¶ 13; A.244 ¶ 19. It once again asserted without details that it would share with the public its analysis through unspecified

“memoranda, reports, or press releases,” through its media contacts that had supposedly published its work in the past, its website, a recently created e-mail newsletter, and through Twitter and Facebook. A.046-48.

On January 6, 2012, the FTC denied COA’s fee waiver requests for failure to prove “that disclosure of the requested records to [COA] will ‘be likely [to] contribute significantly to the public understanding of the activities and operations of government.” A.050-51; A.226 ¶ 15. The FTC provided 100 free pages of documents to COA as an “Other (General Public) requester” under 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b), but withheld portions of them under FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). A.050; A.226 ¶ 15; A.245 ¶ 22.

On January 27, 2012, COA appealed the FTC’s fee waiver and reduction denials (as described above), but did not challenge any of the FTC’s withholdings under FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6. A.152-60; A.226-27 ¶ 16. The FTC denied the appeal in the February 27, 2012 letter described above (which also addressed COA’s request for reconsideration of the denial of fee waivers for its first FOIA request). A.161-64. That letter noted that COA had still “failed to provide any meaningful level of detail regarding your organization’s dissemination efforts or ability,” and denied COA’s “request for consideration as a ‘representative of the news media’” under FOIA. *Id.*; A.227 ¶ 17. It also concluded that COA’s

“second FOIA request was made primarily in the organization’s own commercial interest, rather than in the interest of the public.” A.162; A.227 ¶ 17.

IV. COA’s Third FOIA Request (February 2012) (FOIA-2012-00687)

In its appeal from the denial of fee waivers as to its second FOIA request, COA again made a further, conditional FOIA request – *i.e.*, a request for the release of records in the event its fee waiver request was again denied.

Accordingly, upon denying the fee waiver appeal in its February 27, 2012, letter, the FTC addressed what was now COA’s third FOIA request. That request sought three categories of records:

(1) All records relating to the drafting, formulation, and revision of the Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising concerning social media authors or bloggers between January 1, 2009 and September 6, 2011.

(2) All documents, including e-mail communications, referring or relating to the FTC orders, decisions, memoranda, interpretations, instructions, statement of policy, or guidelines to staff for the purposes of evaluating fee waiver requests under the public interest exception.

(3) All documents, including e-mail communications, referring or relating to the process by which FTC determined that Cause of Action was not entitled to a fee waiver for either its August 30, 2011 FOIA request or October 28, 2011 FOIA request.

A.159-60; A.226-27 ¶ 16; A.245 ¶ 23. COA did not initially seek a fee waiver in connection with this request.

The FTC responded on March 19, 2012, informing COA that it would not address the first category of its third request because it was duplicative of COA's first FOIA request. A.174 n.1; A.228 ¶ 18; A.245 ¶ 24. The FTC notified COA that it had located 92 pages of responsive records relating to the second and third parts of the request, of which 16 pages (consisting of three internal memoranda and two screen shots of COA's website) were exempt in full under FOIA Exemption 5, and thus it was releasing the remaining pages free of charge.³ A.174; A.228 ¶ 18; A.231-32 ¶¶ 26-27; A.246 ¶ 26.

COA filed an April 4, 2012 appeal of the FTC's determination regarding its third FOIA request, challenging the FTC's withholdings, demanding a *Vaughn* index of withheld documents, seeking a fee waiver and/or reduction for the first time with respect to the third request, and demanding responses to contention interrogatories regarding whether the requested documents were in the possession of the FTC. A.176-84; A.228-29 ¶ 19. In support of its fee reduction request, COA claimed that it would disseminate information it received through its online newsletter, and use it to write two news articles that it would publish on its website and distribute to media sources and through its newsletters. A.184. COA

³ The letter misstated the number of responsive pages; in fact, 95 pages of responsive materials had been located.

continued to fail to provide details about its dissemination capabilities, such as the number of subscribers to the newsletter or viewers to its website.

The FTC denied COA's appeal on May 7, 2012. A.185-86; A.229 ¶ 20. The FTC explained that it was not required to provide a *Vaughn* index during administrative proceedings, nor to respond to contention interrogatories in an administrative appeal, and that COA's fee waiver and/or reduction request was moot because there were no fees associated with this request. *Id.*

V. The District Court's Ruling

On August 19, 2013, the District Court granted the FTC's motion for summary judgment with respect to the fee issues now before this Court, while denying the motion with respect to the withholding of certain requested records. A.373-418. The District Court first held that the FTC properly denied COA's request for a public interest fee waiver for the first FOIA request because COA failed to show it had the ability to disseminate the requested information to a reasonably broad segment of the public – *e.g.*, it provided no details regarding the number of viewers of its website, and did not show that any of its media contacts would disseminate the information from this request. A.389-92.

The District Court next held that COA also was not entitled to a public interest fee waiver for its second FOIA request, for substantially the same reasons as the first request. A.392-94. The District Court also held that COA failed to

show that the requested information would significantly contribute to public understanding because the primary beneficiary of the requested information was not the public, but COA, which could use it in challenging the FTC fee waiver denials in its first request. A.394-96.

The District Court further held that COA's fee waiver request in connection with its third FOIA request was moot because no fees were assessed for it, because the FTC had provided fewer than 100 pages, at no cost. A.397-400.

The District Court next held that the FTC properly denied COA's request for a fee reduction as a representative of the news media for its first and second requests because COA had failed to provide sufficiently detailed information about any published work it planned to create or that it had the ability to disseminate any work from these requests to the public. The District Court also held that COA's activities were not organized especially around dissemination, but that it acted more like a middleman for dissemination to the media. A.400-06.

Turning to the limited FOIA exemption issues before it, the District Court held that COA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in failing to appeal the FTC's withholdings in connection with its second FOIA request. A.407-09.

Finally, the District Court held that the FTC properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 5 three internal memoranda in response to COA's third request but improperly withheld two screen shots of COA's website. A.409-17.

On September 12, 2013, the District Court issued a final judgment in this case in which it ordered the FTC to produce the two screenshots. A.419. The FTC did so, and does not appeal that ruling.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

COA and its supporting *amici* attempt to frame this appeal as a broad referendum of the rights of newly formed social media organizations to access government records. However, nothing in the District Court's decision bars bloggers or other social media organizations from receiving fee waivers or reductions under FOIA if they satisfy the pertinent statutory standards. In criticizing the District Court's analysis, COA relies upon exactly the same precedents that the District Court relied upon in granting the FTC's motion for summary judgment.

COA failed to show that it was entitled to a fee reduction as a "representative of the news media," for either its first or second FOIA requests, because it provided insufficient details about any "distinct work" it intended to produce from the requested materials and made no showing that it could adequately distribute any such work to a sufficiently large segment of the public. As the administrative record shows, COA – a public interest law firm and self-described government watchdog organization – acted as a mere "middleman" making information available to the news media.

For similar reasons, COA failed to satisfy its burden of showing it was entitled a public interest fee waiver for its first and second requests. COA never showed that it had the ability to disseminate the information to a reasonably broad segment of the public; rather, it provided only conclusory assertions regarding its ability to inform the public. COA was undeserving of a public interest fee waiver for its second request for the additional reason that the requested information – which it intended to use in litigation over its first request – would not contribute significantly to public understanding of the government, but was in COA’s commercial interest.

Finally, the District Court correctly ruled that COA’s third request was moot because no fees were associated with this request.

Because the administrative record shows that COA failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it qualified for a fee waiver or a fee reduction in connection with its first two FOIA requests, and that its third FOIA request was moot, the District Court’s ruling should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment *de novo*. *Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti*, 326 F.3d 1309, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The District Court also reviews *de novo* an agency’s denial of a FOIA public interest

fee waiver request, *id.*, as well as the agency's determination whether the requester is a representative of the news media, *Brown v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Off.*, 226 Fed. App'x 866, 868 (11th Cir. 2007), based on the record before the agency. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii).⁴

II. The District Court Correctly Held that COA Did Not Qualify as a Representative of the News Media for FOIA Requests One and Two.

A. A FOIA Requester Bears the Burden of Establishing That It Qualifies as a Representative of the News Media.

FOIA defines “a representative of the news media” as “any person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii); *see also Nat'l Sec. Archive v. U.S. Dept. of Def.*, 880 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (articulating standard subsequently incorporated into FOIA). The statute also defines “news” to mean “information that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public,” and further provides that “as methods of news delivery evolve (for example, the adoption of the electronic dissemination of newspapers through

⁴ While there is some disagreement within the District Courts as to the standard of review regarding an agency's determination whether a requester is a representative of the news media, *compare Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 122 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (reviewed under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard) *with Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2002) (compiling cases and applying *de novo* review), the District Court's determination here should be affirmed under either standard.

telecommunications services), such alternative media shall be considered to be news-media entities.” *Id.*

The case law is settled that the requester has the burden of showing that it qualified for a fee waiver, *see, e.g., Rossotti*, 326 F.3d at 1311, and the Court should apply the same burden of proof for a fee reduction as a representative of the news media, because there is no basis in the statute to treat the two differently with respect to the burden of proof. *Accord* COA Brief at 15 (conceding burden of proof generally).

Before the 2007 amendments to the FOIA, this Court held that to be a “representative of the news media,” the requester must show the intent and ability both to create a “distinct work” and to publish or otherwise disseminate that work to the public – passively making it available or acting as an “intermediary” with the media is insufficient. *See, e.g., Nat’l Sec. Archive*, 880 F.2d at 1386-87 (requester acted as “publisher” by obtaining “raw materials” from FOIA requests and other sources to create “document sets”). The statutory text now mirrors that standard in subparagraph 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (“uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience”), and the Court should apply the same standard from *Nat’l Security Archive*. In addition, the entity must show that its operational activities are especially organized around

its ability to publish or broadcast news to the public. *See* 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(2) (2012).⁵

As the Commission correctly determined, and the District Court below correctly confirmed, COA simply failed to carry its burden of establishing two prerequisites to “news media” status. It showed neither that it would use the information to create a distinct new work, nor that it had the ability to publish or otherwise disseminate any such work to a public audience. Even giving proper solicitude to emerging “alternative media” – which the Commission and the District Court did – failure to meet these core requirements precludes COA’s request for favored treatment as a representative of the news media.

COA and its *amici* speculate that its fee waiver and reduction requests were denied as part of a plan to discourage requesters who, like COA, are likely to be critical of the agency. *E.g.*, COA Brief at 38-41; DCNF Brief at 19-25. The FTC’s fee determinations, however, are both based solely on applying the governing standards to COA’s submissions and are entitled to a presumption of regularity that COA failed to rebut. *Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Schreiber*, 381 U.S. 279, 296 (1965). COA has adduced no evidence to rebut that presumption.

⁵ *See also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Defense*, 241 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing analogous Department of Defense rule).

COA also claims that it was discriminated against by the FTC as shown by other fee waiver requests it claims were more conclusory but that were granted by the FTC. COA Brief at 40 n.23. *Amicus* Daily Caller similarly complains that the FTC granted “left-leaning organizations” preferential treatment. DCNF Brief at 23-24. Neither COA nor *amicus* present any factual basis for these claims—such as any attempt to compare COA’s dissemination abilities with those of other requesters. In any event, each FOIA fee waiver or reduction determination is necessarily made upon the particular facts of the request and requester, and a court should not compare unrelated matters when assessing such fee determinations. *See, e.g., Nat’l Sec. Archive*, 880 F.2d at 1383 (“case-by-case” analysis required).

B. COA Failed to Satisfy its Burden of Showing a “Distinct Work” It Planned to Create from Either its First or Second Requests.

Contrary to COA’s protestations, COA Brief at 23-30, the District Court correctly concluded that COA failed to show that it had “use[d] its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work,” as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii), for either its first or second requests. In *National Security Archive*, this Court found the requester to have satisfied this criteria where it “gathers information from a variety of sources, [and] exercises a significant degree of editorial discretion in deciding what documents to use and how to organize them” in order to create a distinct final product. 880 F.2d at 1387. The District

Court correctly held that COA failed to identify any distinct work it intended to publish from the requested information, but rather only relied on “unspecified” information posted on its website, social media sites, and in an email newsletter.

A.402-03. The District Court’s conclusion is consistent with decisions in this Circuit that a requester must provide non-conclusory support for its fee waiver or reduction claims. *E.g., Rossotti*, 326 F.3d at 1312, 1314 (analyzing public interest exception). See also *National Security Archive*, in which this Court found sufficient that the requester “expressed a firm intention” to create a number of “document sets” on topics of current interest, including international relations and nuclear weapons policy, from the requested information. 880 F.2d at 1386.⁶

COA complains that it should not be required to “precisely outline” what it would produce until it receives the information. COA Brief at 27-29. The District Court, however, imposed no such a requirement; rather, it simply recognized that COA had failed to meet the basic statutory standard because it “did not indicate any distinct work it planned to create based on the requested information.” A.402-03. The record confirms this conclusion, as to both COA’s

⁶ Accord *Judicial Watch*, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60 (insufficient showing where requester made information available to reporters, posted information on its website, issued press releases, and conveyed information in radio and television appearances); *Judicial Watch*, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (insufficient showing where requester failed to “identify an article, report, or book for which it planned to use the requested information”).

first and second FOIA requests. COA failed to identify any distinct final product for its first request, despite multiple opportunities to do so. Instead, it simply parroted the statutory standard, generically asserted it would “provide the information to the public,” or that its website “publicizes its findings.” *E.g.*, A.026; A.030; A.038. It likewise provided only conclusory responses with respect to the “distinct work” it planned to produce from its second FOIA request, claiming simply that it would create unspecified “memoranda, reports, or press releases,” or that it has in the past generically “report[ed] on [obtained] information, analyz[ed] relevant data, [and] evaluate[d] the newsworthiness of the material,” *e.g.*, A.046; A.158, without providing any details of the editing or “distinct work” it planned to prepare from *this* request.

The District Court buttressed its conclusion by pointing to other factors that cut against any prospect that COA would use the requested materials to create a new and unique work, such as COA’s failure to show that it would draw on “a range of sources,” and that the newsletter it identified had commenced operations only a month before COA’s second FOIA request. A.402. COA’s criticisms of those observations do not show any error. Contrary to COA’s argument (COA Brief at 24-26), the District Court employed the “range of sources” factor, just as this Court did in *National Security Archive*, 880 F.2d at 1386-87 – *i.e.*, as one among several indicia of whether the requester would create a new work or simply

serve as a conduit for information. And while COA asserts that it gathered information from multiple sources generally, COA Brief at 24-26, it made no showing that it sought information from sources other than its same FOIA requests in this instance. Furthermore, while COA also challenges the District Court's findings regarding the frequency of its newsletter, COA Brief at 27-28,⁷ COA admits that it only began operating *two weeks* before its first FOIA request. COA Brief at 27. Indeed, COA never produced any evidence of its purported newsletter. In any event, COA never provided details of any final "distinct work" it intended to publish in the newsletter, but simply claimed that the newsletter generically "provides subscribers with . . . information the organization has received from government entities." *E.g.*, A.048.

COA also argues that "the relevant question" is "whether the requester publishes distinct works in general," not "a distinct work with the materials received in a given FOIA request." COA Brief at 29 n.16. It provides, however, no support for this proposition, which is directly contrary to the statutory language that the "distinct work" must necessarily be the result of the particular FOIA

⁷ In its discussion of its newsletter, COA relies on new material that was not submitted to the Commission, *see* COA Brief at 28 (citing SA-116), is not part of the administrative record, and therefore, should not be considered here. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii).

request at issue. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (“uses its editorial skill to turn the raw material into a distinct work”).

C. COA Failed to Satisfy its Burden of Showing That It Could Adequately Distribute its Distinct Work to a Sufficiently Broad Audience.

The District Court also correctly held that COA failed to meet its burden of proving the third prong of the news media representative test for its first and second requests: that it “distributes [its distinct] work to an audience.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). As COA itself recognized, COA Brief at 31, the requester must *actively* distribute its work; “merely mak[ing] information available to the public” is insufficient. *Accord Nat’l Sec. Archive*, 880 F.2d at 1386. Thus, “middlemen” or “information vendors,” who merely provide information to others, or who simply make such information “available,” are not news media representatives. *Nat’l Sec. Archive*, 880 F.2d at 1387 (citation omitted).

The ability to “distribute” can be shown by concrete information regarding the requester’s dissemination capabilities, for example, the number of subscribers to its newsletter or the number of visitors to its website. *See, e.g., Rossotti*, 326 F.3d at 1314 (in discussing dissemination ability under the public interest waiver analysis, court relied on newsletter with monthly circulation of more than 300,000, website with up to one million viewers daily, and a listserv with over 60,000 subscribers). As this Court clarified in *National Security Archive*, this inquiry

turns on the requester's *own* publication activities, and cannot be satisfied by providing such information to others that might publish the information. 880 F.2d at 1386-87. In the present case, the District Court correctly held that COA's evidence showed that it lacked the ability to distribute its work itself, and instead acted as a middleman by making its information "available" to the media and the public. A.404-05.

Amicus Reporters Committee criticizes the District Court's distinction between *disseminating* information and making it *available* as an arbitrary "active/passive" distinction. RC Brief at 15. However, this is precisely the principled distinction this Court drew in *National Security Archive* to distinguish between a news media entity that proactively "publishes or disseminates information to the public" and one that does not. 880 F.2d at 1387. Further, while there will always be some line drawing as to the number of viewers to a website or subscribers to a newsletter that represent an adequate dissemination ability, *see* RC Brief at 15-16, here COA made *no showing* of such dissemination ability through any medium. Finally, Reporters Committee's assertion that FOIA only requires distribution to any size "audience" (even presumably one person), runs counter to holdings in *National Security Archive*, which relied on the requester's ability to distribute its document sets broadly to the public, 880 F.2d at

1387, and in *Rossotti*, which relied on the thousands of website viewers and newsletter and listserv subscribers, 326 F.3d at 1314.

COA challenges the District Court's statement that COA cannot simply borrow its media contacts' credentials to support its own claim as a representative of the news media, COA Brief at 33 (citing A.404-05), but in fact the record clearly shows that COA repeatedly relied upon its third party news media contacts throughout its first and second requests to assert its dissemination capabilities. *E.g.*, A.042 n.11; A.154 n.7. Indeed, *amicus* Daily Caller confirms COA's role as a middleman, not as a publisher. *See* DCNF Brief at 16 ("By their very nature, nonprofits are indispensable 'middleman' for dissemination. Organizations such as DCNF utilize for their own publications the investigative work of nonprofits.").

The District Court correctly concluded that none of COA's asserted dissemination methods distributed the information to a significantly broad audience. A.404-06. For example, COA claimed that it could distribute the requested information through its newsletter, website, social media sites (like Facebook and Twitter) and media contacts. However, those claims simply ignore its operational capabilities at the time of its FOIA requests. The administrative record shows that, at the time of its FOIA requests, COA was a newly formed organization that provided only vague, conclusory allegations about its future intent or ability to distribute the requested information, and often simply parroted

the statutory standard. *E.g.*, A.026; A.035. Indeed, COA concedes that it only “began operating on August 15, 2011, merely two weeks before it sent its first FOIA request to FTC on August 30, 2011,” COA Brief at 27, and that its “publishing practices and methods of dissemination were nascent and developing.” COA Brief at 45.

As the District Court correctly found, COA’s newsletter “did not even exist until *after* it made its first FOIA request, and had only been published for a month when it filed its second request.” A.404 (emphasis added). At no time did COA provide the FTC evidence of the newsletter’s existence, the number of subscribers to the newsletter, or the frequency of its publication, and such information could not be discerned from its website. A.162. Further, while COA repeatedly relies upon its website for its dissemination capabilities, *e.g.*, A.048, the administrative record shows that COA’s website was not even functioning during at least a portion of its first and second requests. A.035 at 1 n.2. The FTC recognized the inadequate dissemination capabilities of the website.⁸

⁸ For example, COA cites to its January 27, 2012 appeal letter as an example of its website’s dissemination abilities. COA Brief at 32 (citing A.167). However, while the letter claimed that the website “also includes links to thousands of pages of documents” COA had obtained through previous FOIA requests, the FTC found that COA had *not* in fact linked any documents responsive to its previous FOIA requests on its website and that its website did not evince an independent basis to show COA’s ability to distribute its work. A.162.

COA also claimed to have disseminated information through its social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, *e.g.*, A.048, but it never provided information about the number of viewers or followers to these sites. It repeatedly referenced third party media sources that supposedly published its previous works, *e.g.*, A.042 n.11; A.046 n.8; A.154 n.7, but it never claimed that any of those media contacts was interested in, or would publish, the information it received from *these* requests. A.162. As for COA's statement that it had provided the District Court a list of media publications supposedly interested in its work, COA Brief at 35, this must be disregarded because it simply cites a statement in its District Court legal brief, A.262, which itself relied upon a document, A.331-36, that was not in the administrative record.

Finally, as the District Court correctly found, COA's activities were not "organized especially around dissemination." A.405-06. Rather, COA's status was more like the plaintiff in the *Judicial Watch* cases, acting as a government watchdog or public interest law firm that collected information as a middleman and made that information available to the public and to the media, but was not itself a "representative of the news media." Indeed, in its initial request, COA described itself as "a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation that uses public policy and legal reform strategies to ensure greater transparency in government, protect taxpayer interests and promote social and economic freedoms." A.020. It conspicuously failed to

characterize itself as a news media representative or even mention any journalistic activities in which it engaged. While COA subsequently described itself as a “representative of the news media” (after having its public interest fee waiver request denied), *e.g.*, A.026, such self-interested designations fall far short of satisfying the statutory criteria.

D. Purported Representatives of “Alternative” News Media Must Still Meet the Established Standards.

Contrary to COA and *amici*’s contention, the District Court demonstrated no lack of understanding of FOIA’s application to “alternative media.” Rather, it simply recognized that this Court’s well-established standards regarding FOIA fee category determinations still apply in the context of “alternative media,” and that COA failed to satisfy these standards. The Commission agrees with COA, COA Brief at 20, that Congress intended the term “representative of the news media” to evolve as new technologies develop to disseminate information to the public.⁹ However, the statutory structure, history, and policy show that such media must still satisfy the statutory requirements to be deemed a “representative of the news media” – not that any entity that considers itself “alternative media” automatically qualifies.

⁹ As recently amended, the FTC’s FOIA fee and fee waiver regulations expressly recognize this. *See* Freedom of Information Act; Miscellaneous Rules, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,680-01 (Mar. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 4) (implementing 2007 FOIA amendments) (SA-015).

COA and *amici* argue that the FTC's regulation at the time of its FOIA requests was *ultra vires* because it did not include the statutory language that "alternative media shall be considered to be news-media entities." COA Brief at 17, 39 n.11; DCNF Brief at 28. This argument fails for two reasons. First, COA neither raised this argument below nor argued extraordinary circumstances in presenting it here in the first instance, and therefore this Court should refuse to hear it on appeal. *See, e.g., Hormel v. Helverling*, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941); *Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 958 F.2d 416, 419 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Second, COA makes no showing that the lack of such express language in the regulations had any effect whatsoever on the Commission's fee waiver or fee reduction determinations – much less on the ruling of the District Court – which, as shown in text, comported entirely with the amended statute, and the governing standards in this Circuit.

COA and Reporters Committee argue that the District Court applied an outdated test that is contrary to the broadened news media fee reduction provision in the 2007 amendments to FOIA, particularly as applied to requesters who use internet-based media to disseminate information, and in support cite to various statements in the legislative history made by Sen. Leahy. COA Brief at 22-23;

RC Brief at 13.¹⁰ That history confirms, however, that Congress intended the definition of “representative of the news media” in the OPEN Government Act to incorporate the existing judicially crafted standards for news media requesters. For example, congressional statements make clear that the 2007 amendments incorporated this Circuit’s standard articulated in *National Security Archive*. See 153 Cong. Rec. S10,988 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kyl, bill’s co-sponsor, that “given that this construction of the term news media as used in FOIA has been in effect for 17 years, I do not think anyone can reasonably fear that codifying it will turn the world upside down.”). Congress simply included “alternative media” in this definition to ensure that federal agencies would not “automatically exclude” internet-based forms of media that otherwise qualify when deciding whether to waive FOIA fees. *Id.* at S10,987 (statement of Sen. Leahy).

Indeed, Congress recognized the importance of “preserv[ing] commonsense limits on who can claim to be a journalist.” *Id.* at S10,988 (statement of Sen. Kyl). As Senator Kyl explained, “[s]earch fees are one of the principle tools that agencies use to encourage requesters to clarify and sharpen their requests.” *Id.* But “in the age of the internet, anyone can plausibly state that he ‘intends’ to

¹⁰ COA and *amici* also assert that swift advances in technology, permitting nonprofits to disseminate effectively information to the public through the internet, warrant a presumption in favor of granting fee waivers or reductions to nonprofits. See COA Brief at 37 n. 21; DCNF Brief at 8, 17, 19. However, FOIA provides no such presumption.

broadly disseminate the information that he obtains through FOIA.” *Id.* If merely using internet media were enough to qualify for a fee reduction, “search fees would no longer serve” this purpose, and “[o]verall, this would waste FOIA resources and slow down processing of all requests. Such a result would not be in anyone’s interest.” *Id.* at S10,988. The amendment was intended to “prevent gamesmanship” by entities “who cannot logically be considered journalists,” but claim to be to avoid paying search fees. *Id.* Ultimately, taxpayers foot the bill when the government grants a fee waiver or reduction so the public has an important interest in ensuring there are meaningful standards for who qualifies for the fee waiver or reduction.

The ruling below comported entirely with these standards.

Notwithstanding COA’s assertions, COA Brief at 36, the District Court did not “inappropriately dismiss” the sorts of distribution methods claimed by COA. On the contrary, the District Court carefully considered COA’s assertions regarding “its periodical newsletter, website, social media sites, and relationships with media contacts,” A.402, but properly recognized that *in this case* COA had failed to provide support in the administrative record that *any* of its alleged methods of distribution to the public were adequate. A.404-06.¹¹ At bottom, COA’s

¹¹ COA’s reliance on *EPIC*, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 13, regarding the sufficiency of newsletters is misplaced, COA Brief at 36, because that court based its holding in

distribution ability, as reflected in the administrative record, was a far cry from the sorts of documented showing of such capability that FOIA requires.

III. The District Court Correctly Held that COA did not Qualify for a Public Interest Fee Waiver for Requests One and Two.

A. A FOIA Requester Bears the Burden of Establishing That Its Request Will Further the Public Interest.

FOIA fees may be waived or reduced “if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). This requirement consists of a public interest prong and a commercial interest prong. To satisfy the public interest prong, a requester must show that: (1) the information it seeks concerns the operations or activities of the government; (2) the disclosure is likely to contribute to an understanding of the operations or activities of the government; (3) the disclosure will contribute to an understanding of the subject by the public at large; and (4) the information will contribute significantly to such understanding. 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e)(2); *see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice*, 365 F.3d 1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing analogous DOJ public

part on its finding that the requester’s newsletter had a “large circulation of 15,000 subscribers,” while COA made no showing of the number of subscribers or readers to its newsletter.

interest fee waiver rule); *Rossotti*, 326 F.3d at 1312 (citing analogous IRS public interest fee waiver rule).

Amicus Daily Caller argues that the District Court improperly placed the burden of proof on COA. DCNF Brief at 2, 9-12. But COA concedes in this appeal, COA Brief at 15, and conceded below, A.286, that *it* bears the burden of showing that it is entitled to a fee waiver. Moreover, the case law is clear that the burden of proof to satisfy the public interest fee waiver standard rests on the requester. See, e.g., *Larson v. Cent. Intelligence Agency*, 843 F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988); *Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Griffin*, 811 F.2d 644, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1987); *Judicial Watch*, 365 F.3d at 1126. Daily Caller relies, DCNF Brief at 11, on the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Friends of the Coast Fork v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior*, 110 F.3d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1997), which held that "requesters bear the initial burden of satisfying the statutory and regulatory standards for a fee waiver," and then made the unremarkable conclusion that, if the requester makes that showing and the reasons the agency provided in the administrative record are inadequate, then a fee waiver is appropriate. As explained herein, COA failed to meet its burden for either its first or second FOIA requests, and the FTC fully explained its reasons for denial in the record.

The requester must also show that the information is not primarily in its commercial interest, which is shown by: (1) whether the requester has a

commercial interest that would be furthered by disclosure; and (2) that any such commercial interest is less significant than the public interest in disclosure. *See* 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e)(2)(ii).¹² At all times, the requester bears the burden of demonstrating that the requirements for a fee waiver are satisfied. *Larson*, 843 F.2d at 1483; *Griffin*, 811 F.2d at 647.

In particular, with respect to the third element of the public interest prong, the requester must show that the disclosure will contribute to an understanding of the subject by the public at large, by providing specific, non-conclusory details of its intent and ability to disseminate the requested information to the general public. *See, e.g., Rossotti*, 326 F.3d at 1312, 1314 (requester provided estimates of number of people reached through various dissemination methods); *Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of Army*, 920 F.2d 57, 66 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990); *Larson*, 843 F.2d at 1483 & n.5. Even “the ability to convey information to the public” is insufficient without some details of how the requester will actually do so. *McClellan Ecol. Seepage Situation v. Carlucci*, 835 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1987).

Notwithstanding claims by COA and *amici*, *e.g.*, COA Brief at 54-55, DCNF Brief at 17-19, a nonprofit group like COA—even one arguably considered an “alternative media entity” or using a so-called “Social Media Strategy” – does

¹² *See also Fed. CURE v. Lappin*, 602 F. Supp. 2d 197, 201 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing analogous DOJ rule).

not presumptively qualify for a public interest fee waiver and “must still satisfy the statutory standard to obtain a fee waiver.” *Forest Guardians v. Dep’t of Interior*, 416 F.3d 1173, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2005); accord *McClellan Ecol.*, 835 F.2d at 1284 (rejecting such a presumption, because the “[l]egislative history . . . makes plain that public interest groups must satisfy the statutory test”); *McClain v. Dep’t of Justice*, 13 F.3d 220, 221 (7th Cir.1993) (“Nonprofit status does not yield free access to facts”).¹³ While developments such as the internet and social media have doubtless enabled more entities to communicate with broader audiences, the very ease of setting up a blog or website means that there will be many that have few viewers.¹⁴ Accordingly, simply having a blog or website cannot be enough to qualify for a fee waiver. Instead, the requester must still provide sufficient details of its public reach. This COA has not done.

B. COA Failed to Show that Its Disclosures Would Contribute to Understanding by the Public at Large.

Although it had numerous opportunities over several months to do so, COA repeatedly failed to demonstrate that disclosure of the requested records would be

¹³ *Amici Daily Caller’s* reference, DCNF Brief at 8, to such a “presumption” in this Court’s decision in *Better Gov’t Ass’n v. Dep’t of State*, 780 F.2d 86, 95-96 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1986), was to a statement in a legislative subcommittee report issued twelve years before the 1986 amendments. Congress has never implemented such a presumption in FOIA’s fee waiver provisions.

¹⁴ As *Daily Caller* points out, there are “tens of millions of public blogs.” DCNF Brief at 18.

“likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii); 16 C.F.R.

§ 4.8(e)(2). Instead, at each turn, COA provided either no explanation at all or repeated conclusory arguments in support of its fee waiver requests.

Accordingly, the FTC appropriately determined that COA had failed to show any ability to disseminate the information to the public, whether through its website or its claimed media contacts. See A.035-36; A.040; A.224-25 ¶ 11. For example, COA failed to show that any of its media contacts would in fact disseminate – or even had any interest in – information about the FTC’s Endorsement Guides or its fee waiver determination process.

Reviewing the Commission’s determination *de novo*,¹⁵ the District Court explained that COA failed, for its first request, the “third element of the public interest test because it has not demonstrated that the requested information would increase understanding of the *public at large*.” A.389-90. Dispositively, COA

¹⁵ *Amicus* Reporters Committee claims that the District Court erred by relying on the FTC’s regulations regarding the public interest fee waiver and thus did not engage in a *de novo* review of the administrative record. RC Brief at 17-18. The District Court properly cited to the FTC’s regulations as FOIA authorizes agencies to promulgate FOIA fee waiver and reduction regulations, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i), and there is nothing in FOIA that required the agency to ignore its regulations in order to review the factual record before it. In any event, the District Court engaged in the required *de novo* review of the record, see A.384, applying the statutory criteria and governing judicial precedent in doing so. A.383.

failed to provide sufficient, “concrete” details establishing that it had the ability to convey the information to a reasonably broad segment of the public. *Id.*

For similar reasons, the District Court found that COA failed the public interest test for its second request. A.393-94.

More specifically, the court noted that “[t]hroughout its voluminous correspondence with the FTC regarding its first FOIA request, it identified only two methods of dissemination, which it discussed only in footnotes: its website and articles published by news media that have relied upon COA’s past work on other issues.” A.390 (citing A.029-31; A.152-60). The court properly recognized, moreover, that COA failed to

provide any estimate of the number of people likely to view its website, nor did it demonstrate other ways in which it would disseminate the information itself, without relying on another source. And although COA provided a string cite of articles authored and published by other outlets as a result of its past efforts to gather information on other topics, it specified no organizations which would disseminate *this* information.

A.390-91.¹⁶ The District Court compared COA’s dissemination claims to other cases, noting that “[o]ther courts have found similar claims lack the specificity

¹⁶ COA claims that the District Court “imposed an unreasonably high standard” by requiring that the information “increase the understanding of the public at large,” claiming that it “need not reach a broad cross-section of the population to benefit the ‘public at large’ for this purpose.” COA Brief at 53 (citing *Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin.*, No. 1:98CV2223 (RMU), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22872, at *25-26 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2000)). *Judicial Watch*

and certainty to support a finding that a fee-waiver requester has the ability to disseminate information to a reasonably broad segment of the public ” and rejecting requesters’ past works on unrelated subjects as inadequate. A.391 (citations omitted).¹⁷ This comparison was both accurate and appropriate.

As the FTC recognized, at least as of November 2011, when COA’s fee waiver requests were pending, its website was not even functioning, “appear[ing] to be offline and ‘Under Construction.’” A.035 n.2. The FTC further noted that COA’s website remained offline and non-functioning through at least December 2011, A.371, and then, even when it began functioning by February 2012, it did not contain the results of any of its FOIA requests. A.162. Most important, COA never explained how many people viewed its website, and thus

required the requester to show that it “will disseminate the information to a reasonably broad audience.” *Id.* *Amicus Daily Caller* likewise criticized the District Court’s standard. DCNF Brief at 13-14 (citing *Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 19 F.3d 807, 815 and n.4 (2d Cir. 1994) (dissemination must reach a “reasonably broad audience of persons interested in the subject” to satisfy the “public at large” standard). As the District Court recognized, however, COA failed to present concrete information showing that it reached an audience of any significant size. A.390-91; A.394.

¹⁷ The District Court acknowledged that, in COA’s January 27, 2012 letter (A152-60) – nearly five months after its initial request and after multiple reconsideration requests and appeals – COA noted that it also published information on Facebook, Twitter and an email newsletter. A.391 n.3. The court nonetheless found this supplemented information to be inadequate as well, because COA “provided no details about its online presence, including any information about numbers of subscribers, viewers or followers, nor did it mention the frequency of its posts or publications.” *Id.*

did not to support its dissemination ability. A.394; A.162.¹⁸ The District Court correctly concluded that COA failed to meet its burden of showing its intent and ability to disseminate the information to the public. A.394; *see also Rossotti*, 326 F.3d at 1314; *Brown v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office*, 226 F. App'x. at 868-69 (determining that requester's stated purpose of his website, its traffic, and attention it has received "do not establish that he . . . disseminates news to the public at large").¹⁹

C. COA's Request for a Public Interest Fee Waiver for its Second Request Fails for the Additional Reasons that It Would Not Significantly Contribute to Public Understanding and was in COA's Commercial Interests.

The District Court also found that COA failed to satisfy its burden for a public interest fee waiver for its second request for the additional reason that it failed the fourth element of the public interest prong because it did not show the requested information would *significantly* contribute to public understanding.

¹⁸ COA's challenge to what it characterizes as the District Court's "dismissive conclusion" that COA's website was insufficient because it was a "passive repository," COA Brief at 55, falters not only because the District Court never made that characterization, but because COA never provided any details about the public reach or viewers to its website notwithstanding multiple opportunities to do so.

¹⁹ COA's reliance on its April 4, 2012, appeal letter, A.176-84, claiming additional methods of dissemination, COA Brief at 54, not only is similarly conclusory but refers solely to COA's *third* FOIA request, not its first or second. As discussed above, even if COA's newsletters or social media sites are considered, COA failed to provide any details or support about the newsletters or the intended audience of any of these dissemination methods.

A.394-95. COA has not presented any argument to this Court against that conclusion. *See* COA Brief at 52-55 (addressing only the third element of the public interest fee waiver test).

Even if there were some public benefit to the request, it is clear that the primary beneficiary of the requested information was COA, not the public. *See* A.394-95 (citing *Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union*, 811 F.2d at 647-49). As the District Court concluded, COA expressly conditioned its second FOIA request on the denial of its first request, and used information obtained through the second request (*i.e.*, information about other FOIA requests in which the FTC had granted fee waivers under the public interest exception) “to better prepare itself for an appeal of its fee waiver denial of its first request.” A.396. The District Court also noted that COA “never expressly indicated in this second request that it had plans to use the information to inform the public about the FTC’s history of granting fee waivers,” as compared to its first request in which it did express such an intent to inform the public. A.396 (citing A.029-31).

These same considerations also support a further basis for the Commission’s denial of a public interest fee waiver for COA’s second FOIA request – *i.e.*, setting aside whether COA satisfied the four-part public interest prong of the fee waiver analysis, COA is disqualified from such a waiver because it made its second request primarily to further its own private commercial interest. 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(4)(iii); 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e)(2)(ii). As the Commission recognized in its denial letter (and argued below), the information sought in that request was plainly geared to furthering COA's efforts to secure a fee waiver for its first request, either through further administrative appeal, or in a court action. A.162-63 (citing *Research Air, Inc. v. Kempthorne*, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2009)); A.200, A.357-58.²⁰ Although the District Court did not rule on this issue, it did state that "it would likely find COA's second request fails [the commercial interest prong] as well, because of its nexus with the lawsuit plaintiff filed against the agency." A.396 n.4 (citing *Rozet v Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, 59 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 1999)). This ground is fully supported in the record below, and is an alternative basis for affirmance on this point. See, e.g., *Amobi v. D.C. Dep't of Corrections*, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2895933, at *9 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014).

IV. The District Court Correctly Held that COA's Fee Waiver Request in Connection with its Third FOIA Request was Moot Because the FTC Located Fewer than 100 Pages of Responsive Records, and Released These Records to COA Free of Charge.

COA also asserts, without basis, that the District Court erred in concluding that the fee issues were moot for COA's third FOIA request. COA Brief at 43-51.

²⁰ As courts have routinely held, FOIA should not be used as a substitute for discovery in a requester's private litigation or administrative claims against the government. See, e.g., *NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.*, 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citing *Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannerkraft Clothing Co.*, 415 U.S. 1, 22, 24 (1974)); *McClellan Ecol.*, 559 F.2d at 712.

Yet the District Court correctly found that there were no charges for COA's third request because the FTC located only 95 pages of responsive documents, of which sixteen were exempt and 79 were produced without charge. Because COA was entitled to 100 free pages under the FTC's rules as an "Other (General Public) requester," 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(3), there were no charges assessed for these pages, so any fee waiver request was moot. A.397-400.

COA's arguments against mootness fail. It asserts that the FTC wrongly declined to reconsider its renewed request for records relating to the Guides (the first item in Request Three, A.159) on the grounds that it was duplicative of COA's first FOIA request, because (COA argues) its later request added the term "bloggers" to the original request for "social media authors." COA Brief at 44. As a result, COA argues, the FTC failed to review additional documents that would have increased the number of responsive documents to more than 100 to trigger the fee waiver analysis. *Id.*

This new argument lacks merit. Although COA now seeks to draw a categorical distinction between a request for records concerning "bloggers" and records concerning "social media authors," the FTC did not draw such a fine distinction in searching for records responsive to COA's first request. On the contrary, it conducted a search for all documents responsive to the request regarding its Endorsement Guides, regardless of whom the Guides affected. *See*

A.242 ¶¶ 9-10; A.229-30 ¶¶ 21-22.²¹ Correspondence between COA and the FTC confirmed that COA's narrowed first request included information about the Enforcement Guides as applied to bloggers. *See, e.g.*, A.026, A.030. Thus, the search included both "social media authors" and "bloggers" – and, accordingly, item one of the third request was substantively identical to the first FOIA request.

COA's reliance on cases permitting duplicate requests over the course of years, *see* COA Brief at 45, are easily distinguishable as none involved the sort of rapid-fire duplicate requests for the same information as occurred here, where only five months separate the first and third requests. *Compare* A.020-21 (first request) *with* A.152-60 (third request). Even more to the point, the FTC made its final denial of COA's fee waiver request for its first request on February 27, 2012, *see* A.161-64, *the very same day* that it received COA's third request and it searched for materials responsive to that request as of that day. *See* A.174. In that instance, it was perfectly reasonable for the agency to refuse to reconsider item one of request three.

²¹ While the first request originally sought four categories of materials, *see* A.020-21, COA agreed to narrow that request to the first category, which included "All records relating to the drafting, formulation, and revision of the Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising." *See* A.242 ¶¶ 9-10. COA's claim that the FTC "omitted key search terms" in its first request, COA Brief at 50, is without basis as it *agreed* to limit its FOIA request to the narrowed request and search terms used in that request.

For these reasons, the District Court correctly found that COA's fee waiver request for its third request was moot because fewer than 100 pages were produced from the non-duplicative portion of the request. A.400.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the District Court.

RONALD C. MACHEN JR.
United States Attorney

R. CRAIG LAWRENCE
Assistant United States Attorney

/s/ Alan Burch

ALAN BURCH
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 252-2523

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32 (a)(7)(B) and contains 10,815 words.

/s/ Alan Burch _____
ALAN BURCH
Assistant United States Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that, this 7th day of August 2014, I caused copies of the foregoing Corrected Brief for Appellee to be served on all counsel via the Court's ECF system.

/s/ Alan Burch _____
ALAN BURCH
Assistant United States Attorney