

2008.

(U) TAMU is home to one of 42 Confucius Institutes in the United States, and one of two in Texas. Inaugurated in April 2008, the Texas A&M University Confucius Institute is focused on increasing cultural, academic, and scientific connections with China, in addition to strengthening Chinese language teaching in Texas.

(U) TAMU boasts a stout engineering program, specializing in Nanotechnology, Computation, Aerospace Engineering, and Energy. Of S&T significance, TAMU houses a Supercomputing Facility; a BioEnergy Testing and Analysis Laboratory, a Combustion and Fuels Research Laboratory, a Hybrid Vehicles Laboratory; a Renewable Energy Laboratory, a SynFuels Project Plant, a Pulse Power Laboratory, an Accelerator Laboratory, a Nuclear Reactor Laboratory, the Center for Space Power, and the Nuclear Power Institute.

(U) Texas A&M University (TAMU) has the largest nuclear engineering program in the United States. There are currently 291 undergraduate and 111 graduate students with 19 faculty members. US News and World Report ranked TAMU second nationally in undergraduate and third in graduate studies among public universities in 2010. TAMU has two research reactors, seven accelerators (including a microbeam device for determining the response to ionizing radiation on a cell-by-cell basis) and a high-energy pulsed plasma laboratory. The nuclear reactors are a 1-megawatt reactor operated by the Texas Engineering Experiment Station's (TEES) Nuclear Science Center and a 5-watt AGN-201M reactor operated in-house. The latter reactor is used primarily in an undergraduate laboratory course run by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The Nuclear Science Center is run by [REDACTED] and features a TRIGA swimming pool reactor that can be pulsed, a large irradiation cell, beam ports, a thermal column, and a pneumatic "rabbit" system.

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(U) TAMU also houses a Fuel Cycle and Materials Laboratory, a Laser Diagnostics Multiphase Flow Laboratory, a Nuclear Heat Transfer Systems Lab, and a Radiation Detection Measurement Laboratory.

(U) As of late September 2010, TAMU Board of Regents was considering creating the Nuclear Solutions Institute, which would make TAMU the leading center for nuclear studies, second only to National Laboratories. The faculty for the institute would include those professors from the colleges of science and engineering, along with the Bush School of Government and Public Service, and would be a joint institute of the university and TAMU's Texas Engineering Experiment Station. The Institute would use the Cyclotron Institute, applied research within the Nuclear Engineering Dept, and policy research within the Bush School, such as on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(U) TAMU also has a Biosafety Level 3 lab on its campus within the Veterinary School of Medicine wherein ricin, anthrax, Agent Orange, SARS, typhus, and tuberculosis are tested and studied.

(U) The George Bush Presidential Library was established on a 90-acre tract on the West Campus of TAMU. This site also serves as the site of the prestigious Bush School of Government and Public Affairs, a graduate level

institution specializing in international public affairs and national security.

(U) TAMU is one of three Senior Military Colleges which has a full-time, volunteer Corps of Cadets. It provides more commissioned officers to the United States Armed Forces than any other school outside of the service academies.

[redacted]
bryan ra

[redacted] desk
[redacted] fax

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NON-RECORD

[redacted] (CD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 10, 2010 5:24 PM
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: NSHEAB membership

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UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

[redacted]
Management and Program Analyst
Counterintelligence Division

[redacted] (desk) b6
[redacted] (bb) b7C
[redacted] (fax) b7E
office hours: 7:00 am - 4:30 pm
[redacted]@ic.fbi.gov

From: [redacted] (HO) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 10, 2010 4:47 PM
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: NSHEAB membership

Greetings,

Our office recently met with representatives from Texas A&M University (TAMU), College Station, Texas. TAMU does not appear on the list of members for the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board. According to the TAMU representatives they are members. Would you please advise if TAMU should be on the list and what happened if they are not on the list anymore.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

SA [redacted]
Bryan RA – Houston Division
[redacted] (Office)
[redacted] (Cell)

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[REDACTED]

From: Spanier, Graham [REDACTED]@psu.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2010 3:22 PM
To: MAM
Subject: RE: Clearance revisited

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Congratulations on your citizenship! I will put your name back in the hopper with our government colleagues. We'll probably go through another round of selections in 2011. Thanks so much for your interest and willingness.

-----Original Message-----

From: MAM [mailto:[REDACTED]@indiana.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2010 2:40 PM
To: Spanier, Graham
Subject: Re: Clearance revisited

Graham,

Well this problem has now been resolved as I will be officially sworn in as a US citizen next Monday. I always regretted v much that I was not able to accept your invitation to serve on NSHEAB because of the issues concerning citizenship given my longstanding & considerable experience in cyber security, so now that that is solved, I would be very pleased to be considered again sometime for membership of NSHEAB.

Regards,

Michael

On 2/12/10 10:36 PM, "Spanier, Graham" [REDACTED]@psu.edu> wrote:

> Thanks for your note, Michael. The FBI tends to be been flexible on
> such matters, so it doesn't surprise me that [REDACTED] would be
> supportive. The issue comes from the intelligence community side,
> where they have been a bit more reluctant. We have a full complement
> of NSHEAB members at the moment, but I'm pleased to know of your willingness to continue
to join the board.
> [REDACTED] can certainly help with that possibility when the time comes. We
> usually have a couple of spots that come open each year, so I'll be
> pleased to recommend that we keep your name in the hopper. Thanks for
> reaching out on this, and stay tuned. Best...

> -----Original Message-----

> **From:** MAM [mailto:[REDACTED]@indiana.edu]
> **Sent:** Friday, February 12, 2010 10:30 PM
> **To:** Spanier, Graham
> **Cc:** MAM
> **Subject:** Clearance revisited

> Dear Graham,

> I always think it was unfortunate that because of the clearance issue
> given I am not a citizen, that eventually I was not able to accept the
> invitation to join the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board.

> Tonight I was at an IU function with [REDACTED] who I know you know,
> who is an IU alum & who was the guest speaker at the function, and I
> mentioned the matter to him. He seemed very surprised & said he would look in to it.
> So maybe the matter can be revisited as I assume the invitation
> remains open.

> Also, [REDACTED] who I know well, who runs a center at IU and who is
> an IU alum, was recently appointed to the Intelligence Advisory Board,

> and I was thinking of asking him if he's be willing to also look into
> this matter. He of course is very plugged in in such matters.
>
> Hence I'd be grateful for any advice you might have.
>
> Regards,
>
> Michael
>

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED


HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-17-2012 BY 60324 uc haw/sab/rs



P.O. Box 6222
Indianapolis, Indiana
46206-6222

www.ncaa.org



Phone:



Fax:



@ncaa.org

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
National Collegiate Athletic Association

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-17-2012 BY 60324 uc ham/sab/rs



P.O. Box 6222
Indianapolis, Indiana
46206-6222




*Gambling and
Amateurism Activities*

Phone:



Fax:



@ncaa.org

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www.ncaa.org

National Collegiate Athletic Association

NCAA/
NSHEAB

Page 1 of 3
2/18/11
2:00

[redacted]
From: [redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2011 10:31 AM

To: [redacted] Metz, Thomas R.

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Sounds good, would try to schedule the social at the end or the time will be gone with nothing accomplished

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From: [redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2011 10:29 AM

To: [redacted] Metz, Thomas R.

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: NCAA/FBI Mtg

[redacted] sounds good, thanks.

I would say we'd have an hour for this meeting. Maybe 45-50 minutes of substantive stuff, and then a visit with the AD or DAD for 10 minutes.

From: [redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2011 10:22 AM

To: [redacted] Metz, Thomas R.

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Either day works for me and [redacted] let me check with SC Metz what day works best for him.

Let me know how much time is available and I will try to get a quick courtesy with AD Perkins or DAD Perren if they are in. I would like some substantive time with them to address the issue I raised with you.

From: [redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2011 9:42 AM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: FW: NCAA/FBI Mtg

[redacted]
Please see the below messages.

Are you and [redacted] available to meet with NCAA Chancellor Emmert and Penn State President Spanier on the afternoon of 2/18/11 (after 2 pm)? The alternate date would be 2/17/11.

Thanks, [redacted]

From: [redacted] [mailto:[redacted]@psu.edu]

Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2011 9:04 AM

To: [redacted]

1/19/2011

Subject: RE: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Hi [REDACTED]

I apologize for the delay in getting back to you regarding setting up this meeting. I was just able to verify some dates yesterday that Dr. Spanier and Mark Emmert are both available to meet in DC with your group. February 18th between 2-5 p.m. would be preferable. Dr. Spanier will already be in DC for meetings that morning and lunchtime. The second choice would be February 17th.

Can you check to see if we can set up this NCAA/FBI meeting on one of these days.

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Thanks so much,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

President Graham B. Spanier
201 Old Main
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@psu.edu

From: Spanier, Graham
To: [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov' [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov' [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov>
Sent: Wed Dec 08 16:24:15 2010
Subject: Re: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Excellent. I will follow up with Mark Emmert and his colleagues at the NCAA on potential dates in January and February. I'll try to get back to you next week with 2-3 dates that might work to see if we have a match. I am also enthusiastic about such a meeting.

From: [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov>
To: Spanier, Graham
Cc: [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov>
Sent: Wed Dec 08 16:19:41 2010
Subject: NCAA/FBI Mtg

President Spanier,

[REDACTED] and I just concluded a meeting with FBI Criminal Division Supervisors [REDACTED]. Their Section and Unit is responsible for violations encompassing Sports Bribery and Sports Gambling. They work with all of the pro leagues and the NCAA. The opportunity to meet with the President of the NCAA was embraced enthusiastically. A few topics to discuss include;

- A "hypothetical" case in which the relationship between the NCAA and the FBI could be improved.
- The legal issues in protecting source/grand jury and Title III information prior to potential trial
- A possible agreement going forward to directly notify the NCAA President and his OGC 24 hours prior to public release of investigative matter.
 - o The obvious advantage for the NCAA to prepare a public release addressing the violation.
- Direct relationship between the Criminal Assistant Director of the FBI and the President of the NCAA.

1/19/2011

Please give us some proposed dates, and we will coordinate here.

[Redacted]

Unit Chief, [Redacted]
FBIHQ

[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

From: Spanier, Graham [REDACTED]@psu.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2010 4:24 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

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b7C

Subject: Re: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Excellent. I will follow up with Mark Emmert and his colleagues at the NCAA on potential dates in January and February. I'll try to get back to you next week with 2-3 dates that might work to see if we have a match.

I am also enthusiastic about such a meeting.

From: [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov>
To: Spanier, Graham
Cc: [REDACTED]@ic.fbi.gov>
Sent: Wed Dec 08 16:19:41 2010
Subject: NCAA/FBI Mtg

President Spanier,

Tom and I just concluded a meeting with FBI Criminal Division Supervisors Richard Tamplin and Charlie Johnston. Their Section and Unit is responsible for violations encompassing Sports Bribery and Sports Gambling. They work with all of the pro leagues and the NCAA. The opportunity to meet with the President of the NCAA was embraced enthusiastically. A few topics to discuss include;

- A "hypothetical" case in which the relationship between the NCAA and the FBI could be improved.
- The legal issues in protecting source/grand jury and Title III information prior to potential trial
- A possible agreement going forward to directly notify the NCAA President and his OGC 24 hours prior to public release of investigative matter.
 - o The obvious advantage for the NCAA to prepare a public release addressing the violation.
- Direct relationship between the Criminal Assistant Director of the FBI and the President of the NCAA.

Please give us some proposed dates, and we will coordinate here.

[REDACTED]

Unit Chief, [REDACTED]
FBIHQ
[REDACTED]

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12/8/2010

SPORTS GAMBLING 12/8/10
NCAA 300

[REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2010 10:27 AM
To: [REDACTED] (CID) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: NCAA/FBI Cooperation

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[REDACTED]
Thank you for taking the time to meet with us later this afternoon. Based on our conversation the other day, I think a meeting with the President of the NCAA and Co-chair of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB) may be very beneficial to both ongoing and future case involving NCAA equities.

President Graham Spanier of PSU is the co-chair of the NSHEAB and an outstanding advocate for the FBI. He is close friends with former NSHEAB member, Mark Emmert who is now the President of the NCAA. In light of the [REDACTED] debacle and other NCAA issues crossing the line to criminal activity; Pres Spanier asked if we could look into setting up a meeting with FBI personnel to discuss a range of topics. Spanier and Emmert are most interested in gaining an understanding of the FBI's jurisdictional authorities and prioritization with respect to dealing with issues involving extortion, pay to play and others violations negatively affecting NCAA athletes and their member schools.

Look forward to seeing you at 2:00pm.

[REDACTED]
Unit Chief, [REDACTED]
FBIHQ

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[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2011 9:46 PM
To: [redacted] Metz, Thomas R.
Subject: Re: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Works for me

From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Sent: Wed Feb 02 21:44:13 2011
Subject: Fw: NCAA/FBI Mtg

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[redacted]
Please see the below message from Penn State President Spanier. Can we please move the 2/18 meeting up one hour to 2 pm?

Thanks, [redacted]

From: Spanier, Graham [redacted]@psu.edu>
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]@psu.edu>
Sent: Wed Feb 02 21:37:41 2011
Subject: FW: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Any chance of starting our meeting with your criminal folks and the NCAA leaders at 2pm on February 18? If we start as late as 3pm, it will be very tight for me to arrive back in time for two events I have scheduled. I'm sorry I didn't catch this earlier.

From: [redacted] [mailto:[redacted]@ic.fbi.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2011 1:44 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NCAA/FBI Mtg

[redacted]
3 pm on February 18th will work. The meeting will be here at FBIHQ. Should take an hour or so.

Thanks [redacted]

From: [redacted] [mailto:[redacted]@psu.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2011 9:04 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Hi [redacted]

I apologize for the delay in getting back to you regarding setting up this meeting. I was just able

2/3/2011

to verify some dates yesterday that Dr. Spanier and Mark Emmert are both available to meet in DC with your group. February 18th between 2-5 p.m. would be preferable. Dr. Spanier will already be in DC for meetings that morning and lunchtime. The second choice would be February 17th.

Can you check to see if we can set up this NCAA/FBI meeting on one of these days.

Thanks so much,

[redacted]

[redacted]

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President Graham B. Spanier
201 Old Main
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802

[redacted]
[redacted]@psu.edu

From: Spanier, Graham
To: [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov' [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov>
Cc: [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov' [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov>
Sent: Wed Dec 08 16:24:15 2010
Subject: Re: NCAA/FBI Mtg

Excellent. I will follow up with Mark Emmert and his colleagues at the NCAA on potential dates in January and February. I'll try to get back to you next week with 2-3 dates that might work to see if we have a match. I am also enthusiastic about such a meeting.

From: [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov>
To: Spanier, Graham
Cc: [redacted]@ic.fbi.gov>
Sent: Wed Dec 08 16:19:41 2010
Subject: NCAA/FBI Mtg

President Spanier,

[redacted] and I just concluded a meeting with FBI Criminal Division Supervisors [redacted]
[redacted] Their Section and Unit is responsible for violations encompassing Sports Bribery and Sports Gambling. They work with all of the pro leagues and the NCAA. The opportunity to meet with the President of the NCAA was embraced enthusiastically. A few topics to discuss include;

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 - o The obvious advantage for the NCAA to prepare a public release addressing the violation.
- Direct relationship between the Criminal Assistant Director of the FBI and the President of the NCAA.

Please give us some proposed dates, and we will coordinate here.

[redacted]

2/3/2011

BY 2/11/11
COR

[Redacted]
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2011 4:12 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: Columbia professor Cole

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This is just FYI for you. I'm working on collecting "successful examples" and will get that to you later.

Columbia Provost position-
1989-1994 Jonathan R. Cole, Provost

1994-2003 Jonathan R. Cole, Provost and Dean of Faculties

There have been 2 provosts since Cole.

His book: **The Great American University: Its Rise to Preeminence, Its Indispensable National Role, Why It Must Be Protected.** Jan. 2010

It gets mixed reviews on Amazon.
Cole is a sociologist.

Regarding his allegations in the interview/book:

His example is about research with toxins and viruses. I believe Cole is wrong when he lists "FBI." It appears it is HHS that has the control. To work in some labs basic background name checks need to be made, and that can be any DOJ entity...I presume. I've never heard of the FBI "monitoring lab" activities. I don't know what "reporting requirements to the FBI" he is talking about, unless it is the background checks. There are reporting requirements to HHS. Maybe WMD would know more.

Here are some articles on the topic.

Source: Chronicle of Higher Education, May 24, 2002.

Bioterrorism Legislation Puts New Scrutiny on Researchers, Allows Current Projects to Continue

By RON SOUTHWICK

Congress approved bioterrorism legislation this week that would give universities more responsibility for guarding biological agents they use in research, but would not greatly disrupt such studies, college lobbyists say.

The legislation, HR 3448, would provide \$4.6-billion to state programs and improve federal laboratories. It represents a compromise of competing bills that had previously passed the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Senate approved the compromise measure on Thursday, a day after the House overwhelmingly passed it by a vote of 425 to 1. President Bush is expected to sign the bill.

Under the legislation, every university and laboratory that works with "select agents" -- defined as biological material that could be used to pose a public health threat -- would have to be registered with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services or the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Current law requires only laboratories that ship such materials to be listed with the government. Lawmakers have complained that they do not have a clear idea of how many people are working with potentially dangerous biological materials.

The legislation would impose new steps designed to limit access to 42 biological agents, including anthrax, the Ebola virus, and smallpox. The bill would bar from working with those materials any scientists from countries that are listed as sponsoring terrorism, including Iraq and Iran, and any researchers with criminal records. However, all scientists handling such agents -- including U.S.

citizens -- would have to be screened by the government.

College lobbyists say it is unlikely that a university researcher currently working with biological materials or toxins would be restricted from such work in the future. Lobbyists said they were especially pleased that the legislation spells out that scientists who are in the midst of a research project will be allowed to continue their work while the government performs its background checks.

"We were very concerned that there would be a period of time when research would come to a halt," said Janet Shoemaker, director of public affairs for the American Society for Microbiology.

Under the terms of the bill, colleges would have to submit the names of researchers studying biological agents to the Department of Health and Human Services. Universities would also have to get clearance for scientists doing research on plant and animal pathogens for the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The U.S. attorney general's office would conduct the background checks, a step sought by college lobbyists, who had feared that research institutions would have to perform screening themselves.

If a university wished to hire a new scientist to work on select agents, that person would not be allowed to begin work on those materials until the screening is complete. The legislation also includes provisions for an appeals process if the government denies approval.

While college lobbyists are glad that universities themselves will not be responsible for screening employees, some wonder how long the government reviews will take, Ms. Shoemaker said.

In the event of an emergency, the measure would allow scientists to work on biological agents without being screened. Researchers had feared that in a crisis involving bioterrorism, scientists would lose valuable time waiting to gain clearance.

The Health and Human Services Department and the Agriculture Department would each have to draw up regulations regarding the study of biological agents. College lobbyists said they would work with the agencies to see that those rules do not go beyond the protections spelled out in the bioterrorism legislation.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention would get \$300-million to modernize its laboratories under the legislation. Lawmakers in Congress, chiefly Sen. Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican, have said that the center's facilities are in dire need of upgrades.

Here's a link to a pdf that compares and analyzes the "Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002" to a prior law.

<http://www.unh.edu/ehs/pdf/Biosafety-Regulations-Compared.pdf>

This seems to be a fairly balanced review of the idea.

<http://harvardmagazine.com/2003/11/bioterrorism-and-the-uni.html>

[redacted]
Intelligence Analyst
FBI [redacted]

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SOME EXAMPLES OF FBI ASSISTANCE TO UNIVERSITIES

As a matter of policy to protect the integrity of investigations and potential adjudications, details of pending cases are not discussed outside the FBI.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Grand Valley State University, Glenn Duffie Shriver

Shriver spent a year during college studying in Shanghai in 2002-2003 and moved there in 2004 to continue his studies and to work.

On Oct. 22, 2010, Glenn Duffie Shriver, 28, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, pleaded guilty to a one-count criminal information charging him with conspiracy to communicate national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it, and was sentenced on January 21, 2011 to 48 months in prison for conspiring to provide national defense information to intelligence officers of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

According to a statement of facts filed with his plea agreement, Shriver is proficient in Mandarin Chinese and lived in the PRC both as an undergraduate student and after graduation. While living in Shanghai in October 2004, Shriver developed a relationship with three individuals whom he came to learn were PRC intelligence officers. At the request of these foreign agents, Shriver agreed to return to the United States and apply for positions in U.S. intelligence agencies or law enforcement organizations.

[See the DOJ Press Release for more details]

University of Tennessee, Reece Roth

KNOXVILLE, TN—On Wednesday, July 1, 2009, John Reece Roth, 72, of Knoxville, Tennessee, was sentenced to 48 months in prison for violating the Arms Export Control Act by conspiring to illegally export, and actually exporting, technical information relating to a U.S. Air Force (USAF) research and development contract. Upon his release from prison, Roth will serve a term of two years supervised release.

These illegal exports by Dr. Roth of technical information, known as “technical data,” related to his illegal disclosure and transport of restricted military information associated with the USAF contract to develop specialized plasma technology for use on an advanced form of an unmanned air vehicle (UAV), also known as a drone. The illegal exports by Dr. Roth of military technical information involved specific information about advanced plasma technology that had been designed and was being tested for use on the wings of drones operating as a weapons or surveillance systems. The Arms Export Control Act prohibits the export of defense-related materials, including the technical data, to a foreign national or a foreign nation.

After a trial in September 2008, Dr. Roth was convicted of conspiring with Atmospheric Glow Technology, Inc., a Knoxville, Tennessee technology company, of unlawfully exporting in 2005 and 2006 fifteen different “defense articles” to a citizen of the People's Republic of China in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. This law

prohibits the export of defense-related materials, including the technical data, to a foreign national or a foreign nation. These “defense articles” related to different specific military technical data that had been restricted and was associated with the USAF project to develop plasma technology for use on weapon system drones.

Dr. Roth was also convicted of one count of wire fraud relating to defrauding the University of Tennessee of his honest services by illegally exporting sensitive military information relating to this USAF research and development contract.

[On January 5, 2011 the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal of Professor J. Reece Roth.]

FBI relationship with University of Tennessee. From the FBI Strategic Partnership Coordinator in Knoxville:

“We had a great relationship with UT prior to the Roth case, but the case really sensitized the university to beef up its program. It did so by establishing an export control department (it used to be just the Export Control Officer) staffed with folks whose job it is to review all contracts for Export Control components. The university’s Export Control officer and I work very closely. We conduct joint presentations for various hard science departments. She presents a block on Export Control, and I then present a block on foreign intelligence services targeting of American colleges and universities. It has gone over extremely well each time I have presented it. I also conduct presentations on overseas travel. ...UT’s Export Control Officer and I have developed a computer-based Export Control training that the university has made mandatory for all faculty and staff/researchers working on Export Control contracts. It is accessible through the university’s intranet. Upon completion of all the modules, it prints a certificate that goes to the Export Control office. The training is a safety net for the university in the event anyone runs amuck down the road.”

San Diego – Academic and Bio-security Seminar

The FBI held an academic and bio-security seminar in San Diego in December 2010. There was a lot of positive feedback from the participants, to include the following:

- The FBI was informed of two CI intrusion attempts at a single biotech company by foreign agents where the person did not previously know what to do or who to contact with his information.
- A college administrator said we opened his eyes to a whole new world. He had “no idea that there were these issues out there,” and had a list of items to bring back to his school. He thought he was going to learn about “terrorist plots and earthquake drills.”
- The FBI received several invitations to provide CI Awareness briefings to other academic institutions in the area.
- One person wrote, “This should be offered on PBS TV to the public. I think you have shared great info with us today.”

- One university information security officer in attendance wrote, "I took away eight action items for my campus," and she was "surprised by the relevance" of the Economic Espionage brief.

Article from UCLA Today, Feb 05, 2010

FBI tips to safeguard research from prying eyes

International spies are out there — and they want UCLA's research.

That was the message from the FBI at a presentation last week, along with a few tips for protecting the university's intellectual property. Kathryn Atchison, UCLA's vice provost of Intellectual Property and Industry Relations who invited the federal agency to give the talk, said UCLA has had a few "surprises."

"We've had a couple of episodes where foreign companies sent their employees to UCLA as postdoctoral students instead of as visiting scientists," Atchison said. "They worked in faculty labs, and it seemed that information considered private and confidential was leaked to the company before the faculty had a chance to publish it and protect the patent."

In another incident, a graduate student in the Geffen School of Medicine had a research study 'scooped' by a visiting scientist from another country.

And while the university doesn't engage in classified research, economic espionage can be a concern, Atchison said. "We don't do confidential research, but there are times when we need to keep the results confidential until the researcher can publish it. Graduate students' dissertations and researchers' promotions depend on it, and it's important that they get credit."

Foreign companies can use stolen research-and-development to leapfrog over their competitors, said Kevin Moberly, a supervisory special agent in the FBI's Economic Espionage Unit. The danger isn't just from visitors to UCLA — professors invited to deliver lectures abroad have sometimes found the post-lecture Q&A ends up happening for hours in a separate room, much like an interrogation, Moberly said.

On the opposite end of the spectrum are "honey traps," said Peter Lapp, an FBI supervisory special agent, who related a story about a high-up defense contractor who, while on an overseas visit, was exercising in his hotel's fitness center.

"A very attractive young lady got on the treadmill right next to him and started a conversation. He was cognizant enough, knew what was going on and kind of brushed her away. The next day — there was a young man there trying to chat," Lapp said wryly. "These interviews happen, they are real and they're targeting your intellectual property."

The FBI doesn't want UCLA employees to spy on each other, the agents emphasized — they want everyone, including international employees, to be aware of the campus' vulnerability. The nature of the research done here is collaborative and global. More than 60 percent of UCLA's postdoctoral students come from abroad, visiting scholars and scientists work side-by-side with UCLA researchers, and the campus hosts countless international visitors on tours each day.

Add to that the possibility of computer hacking, and it's easier to understand why the FBI created two programs to build relationships with colleges: The College and University Security Effort and the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board.

"You're a target — like any university," said Chris Woiwode, an FBI section chief in counterintelligence. "Ask yourself why are you receiving a request for information? Why is a certain person expressing great interest?"

When admitting postdocs and visiting scholars, Woiwode added, universities may not have much information to go on, but one thing application readers should consider is whether the research applicants hope to do at UCLA meshes with their previous interests and degrees.

"We know there are some universities that are prepping their students to come here to take things," Woiwode said.

But M. Belinda Tucker, a psychology professor and associate dean of the UCLA Graduate Division, which includes more than 200 programs, said the campus will have to count on the FBI and the State Department to determine whether a student is a likely spy.

"Even if we wanted to be in the business of deeming some schools as 'suspect universities,' we don't have the resources to determine that," said Tucker, who is responsible for postdoc and visiting scholar appointments. "We're also concerned about issues of academic freedom. Most of us were raised as academics in an environment of wanting to share knowledge. But it's good that people are being alerted to the potential hazards when new researchers are coming into their labs."

Atchison acknowledged that many academics see a conflict between the knowledge-disseminating profession they chose and the FBI's knowledge-protecting message, but that both sides are important.

The arrest and sentencing of University of Tennessee Professor J. Reece Roth to four years in prison for illegally exporting military data to China sent shockwaves through the academic community, which feared that Roth's role in the espionage was unintentional, Atchison said. The FBI presentation was also designed to allay concerns that professors could face punishment for unwittingly contributing to spying. Woiwode described Roth's willing participation, and he and Lapp answered questions about what would happen if a professor forgot to get UCLA's approval before releasing proprietary information.

"We call that a clue," Lapp said. "We have to prove a plan, an intent."

And UCLA officials would have to be concerned enough to report it to the FBI, explained General Attorney Tammy Bloomfield, local coordinator for the FBI's Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Program and the agency's liaison with L.A.-area colleges and universities. Since UCLA doesn't engage in classified research, Bloomfield said, "We don't care if you don't care."

UCLA can also take steps such as adding automatic security reminders that appear when employees log in and out of UCLA databases, and being alert to sudden resignations, Lapp said. People who quit without explanation or without another job lined up, or to return to jobs they ostensibly quit in other countries, should raise a red flag, he said.

"We often find that suspects resign suddenly on Mondays after spending the entire weekend on their work computers," Lapp said, usually because they were downloading proprietary information.

Atchison is gathering suggestions from department representatives who attended the FBI presentations to identify common themes and ideas for improving UCLA's security. "That presentation was really eye-opening, in sort of a scary way," Atchison said. "You think that at a university you're in a very safe environment, but we're not immune."

"I know some of you are skeptics," Bloomfield said, "But we can be a resource. The theft of intellectual property is very, very real and sinister, and there's a lot more we can do."

[UCLA is a member of the FBI's National Security Higher Education Advisory Board.]

GENERAL AWARENESS BRIEFS

A St. Louis area Study Abroad Coordinators Meeting, 20 January 2011

The attendees of this conference were very appreciative of the information provided. They were initially surprised that the FBI would share this information but also indicated that they would like to have additional meetings in the future. Unfortunately, a big snow storm decreased the expected attendance at this meeting, but those who missed the meeting heard such good reports that they have requested briefings, and the FBI in St. Louis is scheduling individual college/university briefings.

It is clear to the FBI in St. Louis that the colleges and universities want to have this information passed to them. They were a bit suspicious of the FBI at first, but now believe that the FBI is very sincere in its outreach effort. The universities had not seen the FBI's brochure "Safety and Security for US Students Traveling Abroad" and now want copies to provide to their students. They want to be placed on the distribution list for a quarterly newsletter prepared by the St. Louis FBI. They want to use the "Counterintelligence Vulnerability Assessment tool for Academia" as a checklist for their Study Abroad programs. To meet these new requests, St. Louis plans to provide annual or semiannual meetings.

DOMESTIC TERRORISM

ANIMAL RIGHTS / ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMISTS

Michigan State University Arson (31 Dec 1999)

New Years Eve, 1999: The northeast corner of Agriculture Hall at Michigan State University (MSU) was set on fire which reduced the office of the Agriculture Biotechnology Support Project to little more than cinders and melted computers. The fire

did \$1 million worth of damage. No one was injured. Earth Liberation Front claimed responsibility, protesting research regarding genetically modified organisms

In the spring of 2007, information was developed regarding four individuals involved. As a result of a lengthy investigation, on 20 March 2008, *Frank Ambrose* pled guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Arson for several incidents, including the MSU arson. On 11 September 2008, *Marie Mason* pled guilty to guilty to one count of Arson of Property Used in Interstate Commerce, and one count of Arson of Federally Funded Institution, and two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Arson for the arson at MSU. On 12 and 15 September 2008, respectively, *Stephanie Fultz* and *Aren Burthwich* pled guilty to one felony count for their role in the MSU arson.

On 20 October 2008, Ambrose was sentenced to 9 years in prison and lifetime supervised release. Additionally, he is responsible for over \$4 million in restitution. Mason, Burthwich, and Fultz were sentenced on 5 February 2009. Mason received 21 years and 10 months incarceration, lifetime supervised release, and over \$4 million in restitution. Burthwich was sentenced to 14 months incarceration, one year supervised release, and a \$2,000 fine. Fultz was sentenced to two years probation and 100 hours of community service.

Operation Backfire (University of Washington's Center for Urban Horticulture)

In 2006, under Operation BACKFIRE, 18 individuals were indicted in the District of Oregon on 65 counts for criminal activity conducted in furtherance of animal rights/environmental extremism from 1996-2001. The operation included the investigation into the 2001 University of Washington's Center for Urban Horticulture (UWCUH) arson which caused approximately \$5million in damages. The UWCUH was targeted due to its research involving genetically modified organisms.

Other cases: The FBI takes threats to researchers from extremist groups very seriously, and assists universities and researchers in ways to safeguard themselves and their research. If an incident occurs, the FBI is persistent in its investigation.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Oregon State University

A student from Oregon State University was arrested in a plot to bomb the crowded Pioneer Courthouse Square in Portland.

According to a criminal complaint signed in the District of Oregon, Mohamud was arrested by the FBI and Portland Police Bureau at approximately 5:40 p.m. (PST) Nov. 26, 2010 after he attempted to detonate what he believed to be an explosives-laden van that was parked near the tree lighting ceremony in Portland's Pioneer Courthouse Square. The