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


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## **Best Practices For Academics Traveling Overseas**

American academic freedom and the advanced research & development (R&D) conducted at Academic Institutions have resulted in progress in innumerable areas. But, there are still some considerations to help protect your students and your R&D from being stolen by other researchers, or used by hostile foreign governments / their military agencies:

✓Prior to your travel, be sure to visit [www.state.gov/travelandbusiness](http://www.state.gov/travelandbusiness) or [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index/html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index/html) to obtain country background, updated travel advisories and the current political situation of the countries being visited.

✓Do not travel with any unnecessary information or current research on a laptop. Avoid placing internet addresses ("favorites") on any laptop you take. Take only that info which you will present or discuss at the conference. Do not leave your laptop unattended. Make sure your laptop is password protected. Do not continue to use a laptop that begins to run slowly, or acts strangely after taking it overseas. Have the system professionally analyzed for viruses or spyware before and after travel. Recognize that your personal belongings may be searched several times.

✓Understand that foreign universities, foreign companies, and foreign governments are often interconnected, such that any inquiry (personal or electronically) while traveling, actually may be from a hidden interest with an ulterior motive.

✓Not all conference attendees with whom you come in contact with are genuinely interested in your research. Some may be inquiring on behalf of another country or researcher.

✓Be aware of unsolicited requests sent to you on the internet, persons asking questions about your research, and persons requesting your opinion as to the status of others' research being conducted at the Academic Institution. Information about failures in research can be as valuable as successes. Be careful in discussing any research that is not your own.

✓Recognize not all foreign students who contact American professors are doing so on their own accord. Some are directed to do so by a competitor or a foreign intelligence services.

✓Obtain business cards of all personnel with whom you have extensive contact while traveling. Put the date of contact on the back and retain them for future reference.

✓Do not speak about, or comment on, the status of research and development being conducted by others in your department. Defer questions to those professors directly.

✓Avoid political conversations, or offering political opinions, while in foreign countries. This includes in person, on the telephone, or on the internet.

✓Do not take any provocative or suggestive literature with you to other countries.

✓After meeting with the appropriate representative from your Academic Institution, report any unusual personal, telephonic, or internet contacts to your local office of the FBI.

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[REDACTED] **Targeting of Academia<sup>1</sup>**

The academic world—primarily defined as schools, colleges, universities, and research institutes—provides a fertile environment in which foreign intelligence services can operate. Consequently, the [REDACTED] are known to actively target the US academic world for the purposes of recruiting agents, in order to both obtain useful information and conduct influence activities.

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**Vulnerabilities Within Academia**

By its nature, the academic world encourages free thinking and informational exchanges in an open environment. Arguably, such networks are required for research institutes and academicians to accomplish many of their objectives. Within academia, there are clear incentives to build institutional networks to thoroughly explore a wide range of ideas. For instance, it behooves a researcher to develop direct access to primary sources or populations that will assist in actual research. Unfortunately, such an atmosphere is exploitable by an intelligence service, which can use this open environment to identify and target individuals of interest. The researcher looking to obtain direct access to sources of information may have to build networks that run through foreign governments. What's more is that a foreign intelligence service may actively target such a researcher by using various lures, such as the establishment of cultural and academic exchanges.

**Targets Within Academia**

The academic world offers a rich array of targets attractive to foreign intelligence services. US government (USG)

***Basics of Intelligence Collection***

*Intelligence collection is the process of gathering information for use by decision makers. This can include entirely unobtrusive activity that is inherently passive. For instance, open source information, such as from news and media outlets, can be gathered, analyzed, summarized, and passed on to the principal who awaits the information. Sometimes, this requires placing officers or agents in foreign countries to facilitate access to the open source media. Clearly, the advent of the Internet has significantly increased access to this type of open source information, permitting some intelligence services to conduct some degree of open source collection without leaving their headquarters. Intelligence operatives can also maintain overt relationships with individuals in positions to provide open source information on topics of interest to a foreign government. Some of these individuals may even be unwittingly providing information of interest.*

*Intelligence can also be collected clandestinely using methods that are often illegal within the target country in question. Clandestine methods include the identification of individual targets in positions to provide information of use to an intelligence service. Intelligence operatives from a foreign power can build clandestine relationships with targeted individuals who may pass on useful information. In these instances, an individual is recruited to wittingly pass information to a foreign government. A creative intelligence service may even approach an individual under false pretenses where they pose as representatives of another government. In this case, the individual is fooled as to the true recipient of the information being passed. At any rate, individuals passing proprietary or classified information are in violation of US laws.*

<sup>1</sup> The information in this article is largely derived from self-admitted former [REDACTED] [REDACTED] wrote an article titled, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the US Academic Community," that was published in 2002 as a part of the [REDACTED]

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institutions draw on academia for personnel, both for entry level staffing and for consultation from established experts. A segment of the population, both students and faculty, is bound for work within the USG. Another segment is likely to have contact with USG information and policies through many other venues, including work with research institutes and numerous forms of contract work. First, many of these individuals may have access to useful information that can be passed to the [redacted] Second, some of these individuals are in a position of influence. They can assist in directly influencing the US policymaking process or in shaping public opinion on [redacted]

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[redacted]

Given the academic environment, it is not surprising why the [redacted] as well as other foreign intelligence services, target US academia. The situation provides a favorable environment to operate in and a significant target base to exploit. However, one additional reason the [redacted] target this sector is because the cash-strapped [redacted] general lack of resources does not permit an extensive reliance on monetary incentives for recruiting sources. Therefore, the [redacted] have perfected the work of placing agents that includes aggressively targeting US universities under the assumption that a percentage of students will eventually move on to positions within the USG that can provide access to information of use to the [redacted]

The [redacted] devote a significant amount of resources to targeting and exploiting US academia. A large part of the work and effort of [redacted] departments targeting the United States is devoted to influencing American and [redacted] academics, to recruiting them if possible, and to converting them into [redacted] agents. Likewise, students from these universities are the subjects of assessment and recruitment because many of them, after completing their studies, are going to hold important posts in private enterprise or the USG.

***Basic Types of Intelligence Operatives***

*Intelligence Officer – A professionally trained intelligence operative employed by a foreign intelligence service. Such an officer is often deployed to foreign countries by his/her home intelligence service, often under cover as a diplomat at an embassy or a consulate. From here, the officer can attempt to identify, assess, target, and recruit and run agents who have access to information of interest to the intelligence service.*

*Agent – This is a general term that covers a broad range of operatives. Essentially, an agent is an individual who performs tasks for a foreign intelligence service, often after being recruited by an intelligence officer. Such an individual may work in an organization that possesses information of value to a foreign government. Alternatively, an agent may also provide services, such as identifying potential recruits or assessing a targeted individual's willingness to be recruited by a foreign intelligence service. Agents do not necessarily have a clandestine relationship with the foreign intelligence service they are working for. For example, some agents may be in a position to maintain what appears to be a completely overt, legitimate relationship with a foreign intelligence officer. Also, some agents can even be unwitting in that they are not necessarily aware that they are being manipulated and providing information to a foreign intelligence service.*

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The [ ] will also use various front organizations to approach US targets. For instance, the [ ] have developed a network of collaborators and agents located in [ ] universities and cultural centers, who are used to recruit and influence their counterparts in the United States or third countries, under the guidance and instruction of [ ] [ ] who instruct them on what steps to follow.

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**Recruitment Methods**

The [ ] will use a variety of methods and tactics to exploit individuals and organizations in order to achieve their objectives. This process includes identifying favorable individuals to target, gathering information on these individuals, and conducting an actual recruitment.

The [ ] will obtain publicly available information on universities, including details on programs of study, post-graduate programs, scholarships, and organizations. This includes personal information on a university's executives and professors, such as political tendencies. The [ ] target specific universities due to their prestige and importance and their proximity to [ ] in New York, New York, and Washington, DC. This information can be collected directly by intelligence officers under diplomatic cover assigned to the United States or through their recruited agents. It is also logical to assume that given the pervasiveness of academic

***A Recruitment Example***

*Provided by a self-admitted [ ] the following is a possible scenario of how the [ ] might recruit an individual at a US university.*

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information available on the Internet, any foreign intelligence service is capable of collecting a great deal of this information from its home country.

There are many ways in which individuals of interest can be brought to the attention of the [redacted]. For instance, [redacted] operatives attempt personal contact with university officials, often through exchange programs between [redacted] and US institutions. Individuals of interest can also be referred by other intelligence agents. This contact will result in the collection of additional personal information, such as names, addresses, telephone numbers, family information, motivations, ambitions, and weaknesses. This information will assist the [redacted] in determining if there are intelligence possibilities and what the best operational approach to take in targeting the individual. Furthermore, the [redacted] maintain files for information collected through the years on universities, professors, and students. These files include information on contacts and relations of various individuals of interest to the [redacted] all of which can be useful in this process.

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The relationships the [redacted] develop do not necessarily result in the recruitment of clandestine agents. The [redacted] will develop individuals who do not have access to secret information, but because of the individual's political position, or political tendencies, he/she can be used unwittingly to support [redacted] interests. Some of these individuals may not be told openly that they are working for the [redacted] even though it may not be too hard for them to figure out. The relationship may openly appear to be a benign mutually beneficial friendship.

The [redacted] will use multiple methods to gain the cooperation of an individual target. This can include appealing to the individual's political or ideological leanings. For instance, someone who is allied with communist or leftist ideology may assist the [redacted] because of his/her personal beliefs. Similarly, someone with economic motives can be paid. The [redacted] regime does not have unlimited funds to draw on, but can offer privileges and opportunities to invest in [redacted] or to negotiate exclusive business deals. Some individuals are promised business opportunities once the US embargo is lifted. Such individuals can be feted in [redacted] with extravagant, all-expense paid tours.

If necessary, the [redacted] will also use more coercive tactics to gain control of an individual. Compromising information about an individual of interest is noted by the [redacted]. This can occur passively through observation or actively through a deliberate attempt to compromise the individual target. This can include compromising videos or recordings obtained through various means including sexual entrapment. One place for this compromise to occur is when visitors travel to [redacted] for planned tours. Ultimately, the [redacted] can obtain control of an individual in exchange for keeping the compromising information secret.

#### **Hazards of Travel to [redacted]**

Not surprisingly, a key venue the [redacted] use to identify individuals of interest is [redacted] itself. The [redacted] will actively exploit visitors to the island. For instance, academic travel to [redacted] is targeted by a specific department of the [redacted]. This department is supported

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by all of the counterintelligence resources the [ ] can marshal on the island. Intelligence officers will come into contact with the academic travelers. They will stay in the same accommodations and participate in the activities arranged for the travelers. This clearly provides an opportunity to identify targets. Reports are written on visitors that may result in targeting opportunities for the [ ]. It is also worth reiterating that while a targeted individual is in [ ] he/she is particularly vulnerable to [ ] attempts to obtain compromising information that may create opportunities for coercive [ ] recruitment practices.

### Tasking

Once recruited by the [ ] an agent is generally tasked to provide information. The [ ] should already have a fairly good idea of what that agent is currently in a position to provide. However, with the longer term in mind, the [ ] can direct the recruited agent into fields that may permit greater access in the future. For instance, agents can be directed into certain fields of study, which can lead to employment in USG agencies with access to more valuable information.

Agents are also in a position to pass on names of other potential recruits to their [ ] masters, regenerating the recruitment cycle.

### Influence Opportunities

Another priority of the [ ] is influence operations in support of [ ] policies. Many individuals who are targeted in academia are well positioned to assist the [ ] in helping portray the image of [ ] that the [ ] desires. The free flow of information in academia actually assists such [ ] efforts. In fact, those [ ] contacts in academia lacking access to USG information may hold commensurate value to the [ ] by assisting in this public relations campaign.

The many individuals, including academics, businesspeople, religious leaders, political leaders, journalists, and students, who are exposed to [ ] officials or are invited to [ ] to participate in events, conferences, and tourism can be presented a crafted image of [ ] that may ultimately be

#### *Influence Operations*

*In addition to collecting information, foreign intelligence services will sometimes engage in influence activities. The objective of these activities can range from portraying a specific image, usually positive, to attempting to sway policymakers into particular courses of action. Overt contact between intelligence officers and policymakers, government officials, academics, and even average citizens can assist in shaping views of a particular country.*

*Of the more insidious nature, foreign intelligence services can plant disinformation or propaganda among unwitting individuals or task recruited agents to actively disseminate such information. For instance, a foreign intelligence service can draft news articles and books or create video and audio programming to disseminate a particular view to a wide audience.*

*Per the US Foreign Agents Registration Act, which was enacted in 1938, any US person acting as an agent of a foreign principal in a political or quasi-political capacity must make periodic public disclosure of his/her relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts, and disbursements in support of these activities. Disclosure of the required information facilitates evaluation by the government and the American people of the statements and activities of such persons in light of their function as foreign agents.*

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